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PROPERTY FORFEITURE IN THE ERA OF NATIONAL




For much of the twentieth century, the eighteenth amend-
ment's attempt to ban intoxicating liquor1 has stood as a quaint
historical anomaly illustrating the futility of attempting to consti-
tutionalize personal morality. Not surprisingly, therefore, many
studies of prohibition have tried to explain how the amendment
became a part of the Constitution; that is, to explain the reasons
for this historical anomaly.2 Some scholars, however, have gone
* Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State Univer-
sity. B.A., Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 1969; J.D., University of Virginia, 1972; M.A.,
1975.
A version of this Article will form one chapter in the author's S.J.D. dissertation at the
Harvard Law School. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Morton
Horwitz for his critique of an earlier draft of the manuscript.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. The eighteenth amendment was repealed by the twenty-
first amendment. (U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI enacted in 1933). Titles I and II of the National
Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (commonly referred to as the Volstead Act) were
repealed by the Act of August 27, 1935, 49 Stat. 872. Consequently, all prohibition statutes
and cases enforcing prohibition cited hereinafter have been repealed, overruled, or are moot.
Section 1 of the eighteenth amendment provides: "After one year from the ratification of
this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the im-
portation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory
subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."
2. These studies have emphasized a variety of different factors as significant in per-
suading the country to adopt national prohibition. Much of the debate has focused on the
impact of patriotism associated with the World War I mobilization effort. Some scholars
have emphasized the influence of the war. See e.g., S. CASHMAN, PROHIBITION: THE Lm OF
THE LAND 19-21 (1981); A. SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF ExCEss 20 (1962); see also R.
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR 290 (1955); C. MERZ, THE DRY
DECADE 25 (1931) ("The war did three things for prohibition. It centralized authority in
Washington; it stressed the importance ofsaving food; and it outlawed all things German").
Others have, however, downplayed its significance. See H. ASBURY, THE GREAT ILLUSION: AN
INFORMAL HISTORY OF PROHIBITION 136 (1950). For a relatively balanced assessment of the
war's influence, see P. ODEGARD, PRESSURE POLITICS: THE STORY OF THE ANTI-SALOON
LEAGUE 68-70 (1956).
Other explanations that have been advanced include an American tendency toward ex-
cessive moralism, see A. SINCLAIR, supra, passim; the ability of pressure groups committed
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further and have analyzed the prohibition experience itself, and
they suggest that while the eighteenth amendment remained a part
of the federal Constitution for only thirteen years, it had, never-
theless, a significant impact upon American life and culture. They
have identified a variety of specific influences, including the devel-
opment of single issue pressure groupss diminished support for
moderate temperance reform, glorification of alcohol consumption
as a form of social protest that triumphed,5 discouragement of pro-
to a single issue to influence the American political system, see, P. ODEGARD, supra,passim;
cf. D. KYvIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHrBrON (1979) passim (emphasizing the influence of
a pressure group, the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment, in the effort to re-
peal national prohibition); and the status conflict between a traditional America centered in
rural, middle-class, Protestant values and an emerging America identified with cosmopoli-
tan, urban, and immigrant values, see J. GusFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND
THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963); S. CASHMAN, supra, at 19-21; see also A. SIN-
CLAIR, supra, at 5, where the author writes: "For the old American of the villages and farms
distrusted the new American of the urban masses. Prohibition was the final victory of the
defenders of the American past. On the rock of the Eighteenth Amendment, village America
made its last stand."
In the last twenty years, a number of students of prohibition have accepted the period as
part of the progressive movement of the early twentieth century. See generally, J. TIMBER-
LAKE, PROHIBITION AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 1900-1920 (1963); see also P. CARTER,
ANOTHER PART OF THE TwENTIES 91 (1977); N. CLARK, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRE-
TATION OF AMERICAN PROHIBITION 5, 10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DELIVER US FROM EVIL];
N. CLARK, THE DRY YEARS: PROHIBITION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN WASHINGTON 108-27 (1965);
C. CHAMBERS, SEEDrIME OF REFORM 76 (1963) (including the Women's Christian Temper-
ance Union as one of the groups that could be called out to support progressive causes).
One recent study of the repeal movement has argued that no single explanation of prohi-
bition will suffice; an eclectic view is required. See D. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBI-
TION 5-6 (1979):
The Eighteenth Amendment was the product of a century-long temperance cru-
sade, the early-twentieth-century progressive environment, and a temporary
spirit of war time sacrifice. Various historians of the reform have tended to em-
phasize one or another of these factors. However, it is hard to imagine national
prohibition being adopted without all three interacting. (footnote omitted)
3. P. ODEGARD, supra note 2, at 22-23.
4. A. SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 28; cf. D. KYvIG, supra note 2, at 201:
Organized opponents of national prohibition showed concern for creating a tem-
perate society and establishing more effective control over the liquor traffic, but
they foreclosed certain approaches to a solution.. . . [T]hey rejected a compro-
mise often suggested during the 1920s, that is, modification of prohibition to
allow beer and wine while continuing to outlaw more potent distilled spirits ....
Furthermore, by their opposition to federal solutions, the wets bear, willingly of
course, considerable responsibility for the fragmented pattern of liquor control
which emerged in the United States after repeal.
Id.
5. N. CLARK, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL, supra note 2, at 199-205.
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posals for governmental regulation of personal affairs,6 and in-
creased opportunities for the growth of organized crime.7
For the most part, studies of prohibition have ignored one of
the most important spheres of the movement's influence; its im-
pact upon American law, including its influence on American legal
thought as reflected in judicial decisions. That this impact was sig-
nificant seems clear beyond question, for prohibition produced
dozens of important decisions by the United States Supreme
Court, to say nothing of the decisions of the lower federal, and the
state courts." In particular, one can discern considerable evidence
of prohibition's impact upon American legal thought in the devel-
opment of judicially created doctrines in criminal law. Not only
did prohibition stimulate courts to create new doctrines9 and to
refine relatively undeveloped areas, 10 but these doctrinal develop-
ments reveal a pattern of decisions closely paralleling the attitudes
of the general public towards prohibition. The decisions show
6. D. KYvIG, supra note 2, at 199-200.
7. S. CASHMAN, supra note 2, at 56-76.
8. For a listing of the major Supreme Court decisions, see Murchison, Prohibition and
the Fourth Amendment: A New Look at Some Old Cases, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
471, 476-80 (1982). Secondary sources indicate that the number of reported decisions in the
lower federal courts and in state courts was also extremely large. See Arnold, Law Enforce-
ment-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 20-21 (1932); Comment, The
Meaning of the Federal Rule on Evidence Illegally Obtained, 36 YALE L.J. 536, 537 n.2
(1926-27).
Prohibition's impact upon legal institutions was at least as dramatic as its impact upon
legal doctrine. For example, the large increase in the caseloads of federal courts drastically
increased the practice of plea bargaining, and the growth in the federal prison population
prompted the construction of new prison facilities. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBsER-
VANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAws OF THE
UNITED STATES 55-56 (1931). General students of prohibition have understandably been
more cognizant of these institutional influences than of doctrinal developments. See, e.g., H.
ASBURY, supra note 2, at 167-73; H. JOHNSTON, WHAT RIGHTS ARE LEFT? 57 (1930); D. KYvvi,
supra note 2, at 29-30, 108; C. MFRz, supra note 2, at 303; A. SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 211-
12; M. TILLIT, THE PRICE OF PROHIBITION 53-54 (1932).
9. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (entrapment); The National
Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (concurrent power). For an account of the develop-
ment of the entrapment defense, see Murchison, The Entrapment Defense in Federal
Courts: Emergence of a Legal Doctrine, 47 MIss. L.J. 211 (1976).
10. Perhaps the most dramatic growth of a doctrinal area involved the fourth amend-
ment. These developments are recounted in Murchison, supra note 8. For other examples of
doctrinal development, see Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) (testimony of
spouse); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927) (conspiracy); Raffel v. United States,
271 U.S. 494 (1926) (self-incrimination); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (double
jeopardy).
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strong support for prohibition enforcement in the early years, am-
bivalence in the middle years of the era, and, finally, an increased
willingness to protect individual rights in the years before repeal."
Considered together, these various strands of doctrinal develop-
ment suggest that closer study of the prohibition developments
may reveal not only the modern origins of many contemporary
criminal law doctrines, but will also contribute to our understand-
ing of how legal doctrines respond to changing societal values.1
2
Of course, prohibition involved more than judicially created
doctrines; both the eighteenth amendment and its enforcement
statute, the Volstead Act,13 were bold and innovative attempts to
achieve reform through the legislative process. As a result, a more
complete picture of prohibition's impact upon legal thought re-
quires consideration of the judicial response to specific statutory
requirements, and that is the primary aim of this Article. It traces
the Supreme Court's response to one of the most important en-
forcement features of the Volstead Act, the provision for the forfei-
ture of vehicles used to transport intoxicating liquor. After tracing
the course of these decisions, it analyzes this particular decisional
pattern as an example of prohibition's impact on American legal
thought and the judicial role in implementing statutory reforms.
I. THE VOLSTEAD ACT AND ITS ANTECEDENTS
By the end of the nineteenth century, statutory provisions au-
thorizing forfeiture of property used in unlawful activities had be-
come a well-established feature of American law, especially in reve-
nue laws and statutes relating to customs and navigation.1 4 A
number of these forfeiture statutes applied to violations of specific
11. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 476-80, 520-30; Murchison, supra note 9, at 217-18,
220-21, 234-35.
12. See generally Murchison, supra note 8, at 520-32; Murchison, supra note 9, at 234-
36.
13. 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (The official name for the Volstead Act was the National Prohi-
bition Act).
14. Congress occasionally had used the forfeiture device in other criminal statutes in
the late nineteenth century, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647 § 6, 26 Stat. 209, 210
(1890). These statutes, however, seem to have produced few, if any, reported opinions con-
cerning the scope of the government's forfeiture authority. These statutes were apparently
prompted by the Supreme Court's upholding the forfeiture of property held by southerners
during the Civil War. See Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331 (1870); McVeigh v. United
States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259 (1870); see generally Note, Bane of American Forfeiture
Law-Banished at Last, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768, 785-88 (1977).
[Vol. 32420
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tax and customs requirements pertaining to intoxicating lquor,15
but the more important ones were generally applicable to all viola-
tions of revenue and customs laws. 16 The primary revenue statute,
section 3450 of the Revised Statutes, provided that whenever
goods or commodities on which a tax was due were "removed, or
deposited or concealed in any place, with intent to defraud the
United States," the goods were to be confiscated and the following
items of property were subject to forfeiture: the confiscated goods;
"any materials, utensils, or vessels" intended to be used in making
the goods; all "packages" containing the goods; and "every vessel,
boat, carriage, or other conveyance whatsoever. . . used in the re-
moval or for the deposit or concealment thereof. '17 Similarly, the
15. Internal Revenue Act, tit. 35, ch. 4, § 3257, 1873-74 Rev. Stat. 601, 628 (2d ed. 1878)
(distiller defrauding or attempting to defraud United States of tax due on spir-
its) [hereinafter cited as Rev. Stat.]; id. § 3265, at 631 (setting up distillery apparatus with-
out a permit); id. § 3279, at 634 (knowingly carrying distilled spirits to or from a distillery,
warehouse, or store that fails to display the required sign); id. ch. 5, § 3340, at 651 (brewery
attempting to evade tax on fermented liquor); id. § 3343, at 652-53 (removing fermented
liquor from brewery or warehouse without a permit); see also Collection of Duties Act, tit.
34, ch. 4, § 2775, 1873-74 Rev. Stat. 492, 538 (2d ed. 1878) (failure to make special report
required for imported spirits and wines results in forfeiture of those that are not reported).
16. In addition to the provisions quoted in the text, see Rev. Stat. § 3453 (providing for
forfeiture of goods held for sale in fraud of the internal revenue laws) and Vessels in Domes-
tic Commerce Act, tit. 50, § 4377, 1873-74 Rev. Stat. 833, 846 (2d ed. 1878) (providing for
forfeiture of licensed vessel that is employed in a trade other than one for which the vessel
is licensed).
17. Rev. Stat. § 3257. Section 3257 reads as follows:
Whenever any goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any tax is or shall
be imposed, or any materials, utensils, or vessels proper or intended to be made
use of for or in the making of such goods or commodities are removed, or are
deposited or concealed in any place, with intent to defraud the United States of
such tax, or any part thereof, all such goods and commodities, and all such
materials, utensils, and vessels, respectively, shall be forfeited; and in every such
case all the casks, vessels, cases, or other packages whatsoever, containing, or
which shall have contained, such goods or commodities, respectively, and every
vessel, boat, cart, carriage, or other conveyance whatsoever, and all horses or
other animals and all things used in the removal or for the deposit or conceal-
ment thereof, respectively, shall be forfeited. And every person who removes,
deposits, or conceals, or is concerned in removing, depositing, or concealing any
goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed,
with intent to defraud the United States of such tax or any part thereof, shall be
liable to a fine or penalty of not more than five hundred dollars. And all boilers,
stills, or other vessels, tools and implements, used in distilling or rectifying, and
forfeited under any of the provisions of this Title, and all condemned material,
together with any engine or other machinery connected therewith, and all empty
barrels, and all grain or other material suitable for distillation, shall, under the
direction of the court in which the forfeiture is recovered, be sold at public auc-
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general smuggling statute provided that a "vehicle" or "beast" was
subject to forfeiture when used to convey merchandise that had
been unlawfully introduced into the United States. 18
In construing these statutes, the Supreme Court had occasion-
ally upheld forfeitures even where the government could not prove
that the owner of the property was actively involved in the illegal
activities. Most of the early opinions forfeiting property where the
owner was not involved implicated shipowners,1" but the 1878 deci-
sion in Dobbin's Distillery v. United States20 expanded the con-
cept to cover a normal lease relationship. In Dobbin's Distillery,
the person to whom the owner of a tract of land had leased his
property operated a distillery in violation of various provisions of
the revenue laws,21 and the Supreme Court ruled that forfeiture of
tion, and the proceeds thereof, after deducting the expenses of sale, shall be
disposed of according to law. And all spirits or spirituous liquors which may be
forfeited under the provisions of this Title, unless herein otherwise provided,
shall be disposed of by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as the Secretary
of the Treasury may direct.
18. Collection of Duties Act, tit. 35, ch. 10, § 3062, 1873-74 Rev. Stat. 492, 588 (2d ed.
1878). Section 3061 gave customs officials authority to search "any vehicle, beast, or person,
on which ... [they] suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or [which has]
been unlawfully introduced into the United States," and to "seize and secure the same" if
they found merchandise they had reasonable cause to believe was subject to duty or unlaw-
fully introduced into the United States. Section 3062 then provided:
Every such vehicle and beast, or either, together with teams or other motive-
power used in conveying, drawing, or propelling such vehicle or merchandise,
and all other appurtenances, including trunks, envelopes, covers, and all means
of concealment, and all the equipage, trappings, and other appurtenances of
such beast, team, or vehicle, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture.
19. E.g., United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The Palmyra,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); see Note, supra note 14, at 781-83.
20. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
21. Id. at 396-97. The Court's summary of the three bases for forfeiture is quoted
below-
(1) That the lessee, occupant, and operator of the distillery neglected and re-
fused to keep the books required by law, and make the required entries in the
same; that he made false entries in the books kept in the distillery, and that he
omitted to enter in the same the facts required by law, with intent to defraud
the revenue, and to conceal from the revenue officers facts and particulars re-
quired to be stated and entered in such books, with like intent to defraud the
revenue; and that he refused to produce the books kept in the distillery when
thereto requested by the revenue officers, contrary to the statute in such case
made and provided.
(2) That the distillery, the distilled spirits and distilling apparatus seized
were owned by the lessee, occupant and operator, and some other person un-
known and were intended to be used by the owners in the business of a distiller,
in a manner to defraud the United States, contrary to the Act of Congress.
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the property was appropriate whether or not the owner knew that
the lessee was using the property to defraud the public of revenue:
[It is not] necessary that the owner of the property should have knowledge
that the lessee and distiller was committing fraud on the public revenue, in
order that the information of forfeiture should be maintained. If he know-
ingly suffers and permits his land to be used as a site for a distillery, the law
places him on the same footing as if he were the distiller and the owner of the
lot where the distillery is located; and, if fraud is shown in such a case, the
land is forfeited just as if the distiller were the owner.22
Many of the preprohibition decisions construing forfeiture
statutes had involved the application of revenue and customs pro-
visions to intoxicating liquor,2 and the architects of the new prohi-
bition laws appropriated the forfeiture device in the statutes they
drafted. A number of states included forfeiture provisions in their
state prohibition statutes, 4 and the Volstead Act followed this
lead25 by authorizing forfeiture of vehicles used to transport intoxi-
cating liquor illegally. When prohibition authorities discovered in-
toxicating liquor being transported in violation of the Act, section
26 of Title IP' required them to seize the liquor; to take possession
(3) That the property seized was used by its owners to defraud the United
States of the tax to which the spirits distilled were by law subject, and that the
United States had been thereby defrauded of a part of such tax, in violation of
law.
Id. at 396-97 (citation omitted).
22. Id. at 399.
23. See, e.g., Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878); Henderson's Dis-
tilled Spirits, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 44 (1871); The Distilled Spirits, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 356
(1870); United States v. Seventeen Empty Barrels, 27 F. Cas. 1028 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1875)
(No. 16,255); United States v. Thirty-three Barrels of Spirits, 28 F. Cas. 72 (D. Mass. 1868)
(No. 16,470); see also Note, Forfeiture of Property of Innocent Persons Used in Violation
of the Law, 6 VA. L. Rav. 583, 584 (1919-20) (identifying "enforcement of United States
internal revenue laws regarding intoxicating liquors" as "[t]he most prolific single source of
forfeitures").
24. E.g., Act of Jan. 25, 1919, No. 7, § 27, 1919 Ala. Acts 6, 13-15; Act of Mar. 22, 1919,
ch. 217, §§ 1-5, 1919 Kan. Sess. Laws 217, 217-18; Act of Apr. 7, 1917, ch. 294, 1917 Me.
Laws 420; Act of Mar. 19, 1918, ch. 388, § 57, 1918 Va. Laws 578, 612-13; Act of Feb. 24,
1917, No. 38, § 27, 1917 S.C. Acts 69, 74-75. Once the Volstead Act was enacted, a number
of states used it as a model for enactment or revision of their state laws. See, e.g., Act of
May 7, 1921, ch. 80, § 1, 1921 Cal. Stat. 79; Act of Mar. 22, 1921, ch. 9, § 26, Ex. Sess., 1921
Mont. Laws 733, 746-47.
25. S. REP. No. 151, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1919) ("This section has precedent in
Alabama.. ., Maine .... Oklahoma .... South Carolina .... etc.").
26. Volstead Act, tit. 2, ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919) [hereinafter referred to as
§ 26]. Section 26 provided:
When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law shall
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of any "vehicle and team or automobile, boat, air or water craft, or
any other conveyance" used; and to arrest the person in charge of
the vehicle or conveyance. Further, upon conviction of the person
arrested, section 26 provided for the destruction of the liquor and
sale of the property seized, with the proceeds paid to the United
States Treasury.
Unlike the tax and customs statutes, section 26 tempered its
forfeiture requirement with express protections for owners and
lienors. First, the property could not be forfeited unless the person
in charge of the property was convicted.27 Second, the owner could
discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law, intoxicat-
ing liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle,
it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being
transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating liquors transported or pos-
sessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he shall take possession of the vehicle
and team or automobile, boat, air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and
shall arrest any person in charge thereof. Such officer shall at once proceed
against the person arrested under the provisions of this title in any court having
competent jurisdiction; but the said vehicle or conveyance shall be returned to
the owner upon execution by him of a good and valid bond, with sufficient sure-
ties, in a sum double the value of the property, which said bond shall be ap-
proved by said officer and shall be conditioned to return said property to the
custody of said officer on the day of trial to abide the judgment of the court. The
court upon conviction of the person so arrested shall order the liquor destroyed,
and unless good cause to the contrary is shown by the owner, shall order a sale
by public auction of the property seized, and the officer making the sale, after
deducting the expenses of keeping the property, the fee for the seizure, and the
cost of the sale, shall pay all liens, according to their priorities, which are estab-
lished, by intervention or otherwise at said hearing or in other proceeding
brought for said purpose, as being bona fide and as having been created without
the lienor having any notice that the carrying vehicle was being used or was to
be used for illegal transportation of liquor, and shall pay the balance of the pro-
ceeds into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts. All Hens
against property sold under the provisions of this section shall be transferred
from the property to the proceeds of the sale of the property. If, however, no one
shall be found claiming the team, vehicle, water or air craft, or automobile, the
taking of the same, with a description thereof, shall be advertised in some news-
paper published in the city or county where taken or if there be no newspaper
published in such city or county, in a newspaper having circulation in the
county, once a week for two weeks and by handbills posted in three public places
near the place of seizure, and if no claimant shall appear within ten days after
the last publication of the advertisement, the property shall be sold and the
proceeds after deducting the expenses and costs shall be paid into the Treasury
of the United States as miscellaneous receipts.
27. See 9 VA. L. REv. 462 (1923). Section 26 provided that the court was to order forfei-
ture "upon conviction of the person"; it did not expressly state the crime of which the per-
son had to be convicted. The Supreme Court eventually held that a conviction for illegal
possession could trigger the forfeiture requirements if the possession occurred while the li-
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avoid an order mandating that the transporting vehicle be sold by
showing "good cause to the contrary. '28 Third, the owner could se-
cure the return of his vehicle during the pendency of the proceed-
ings by executing a bond in a sum double the value of the prop-
erty.29 Fourth, even when the property was forfeited and sold, the
officer selling the property had to pay all liens that were created
without the lienor having notice of the planned illegal use.30
The legislative history offers little insight as to why Congress
decided to include the forfeiture provisions of section 26 in the
Volstead Act. The House report that introduced the section did
not contain any specific discussion of section 26.31 Moreover, sup-
porters of the committee proposal did not speak against Represen-
tative Sanders' floor amendment to delete the forfeiture provisions
before they voted it down.3 2 The only congressional document
quor was being unlawfully transported. Commercial Credit Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
226 (1928); see infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
28. As originally reported by the House committee that drafted the Volstead Act, the
provision that became § 26 qualified the "good cause" language with the phrase "such as
ignorance of the purpose for which [the owner's]. . . vehicle. . . was being used," 58 CONG.
REc. 2902 (1919) (statement of Rep. Lankford); but that phrase was deleted in the Senate.
H.R. REP. No. 360, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1919). At least two federal district courts subse-
quently held that a conditional vendor's lack of knowledge of the illegal use to which the
automobile was being put would not always constitute "good cause" sufficient to preclude
forfeiture under § 26. United States v. Montgomery, 289 F. 125 (D. Ariz. 1922); United
States v. Kane, 273 F. 275 (D. Mont. 1921). At least one state court reached a similar result
in construing a state prohibition statute. See 32 YALE L.J. 197 (1922).
29. This provision was added as a floor amendment in the House. Its drafter, Represen-
tative Venable of Mississippi, justified it as follows:
I believe it is sound to treat the citizen as innocent until he is proved guilty.
This takes care of the vehicle and has it forthcoming at the trial. This gives the
law the process in the event he is guilty and at the same time permits the inno-
cent man to use his vehicle and not be inconvenienced pending the time he is
adjudicated not guilty.
58 CONG. REc. 2904 (1919) (statement of Rep. Venable).
30. The protection for lienholders was added in a House floor amendment that was
accepted by Representative Volstead, the floor manager of the bill. 58 CONG. Ruc. 2903
(1919). The decisions were split as to whether a conditional vendor should be treated as an
owner or lienor. See United States v. Sylvester, 273 F. 253 (D. Conn. 1921) (conditional
vendor's interest should be protected under the provision applicable to lienholders only if
the seller's lien is substantially equal to the value of the property); Note, Rights of a Condi-
tional Vendor Under the National Prohibition Act, 72 U. PA. L. Rav. 181 (1924).
31. The House report contented itself with the general assertion that the enforcement
sections of Title 1I contained "no new or experimental features" because "[e]very provision
in it ha[d] precedents in State or Federal legislation." H.R. Run. No. 91, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1919).
32. 58 CONG. REc. 2904, 2905 (1919).
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which discussed the forfeiture concept directly was a memorandum
incorporated in the Senate report on the Act.33 It asserted that the
"necessity of [the] provision" was "manifest" because of a "care-
fully worked out system to evade the law" that "was in actual op-
eration." 4 According to the report, that system involved "alleged
owners of automobiles" who gave mortgages to accomplices "and
then when the automobile [was] seized" claimed it alleging "that it
was used without their consent or knowledge. 3 5 These owners
were willing, the report declared, to employ "every possible scheme
to distribute liquor illegally and [to] use the safeguards of property
rights to insure their success."3'
The Senate justification for section 26 is not entirely consis-
tent with the Senate's acceptance of the protections for owners and
ilenors that the House had previously incorporated into section 26.
Nonetheless, the report is significant for gauging the basic purpose
of section 26. It indicates that the section was designed to expand
the government's authority to reach bootleggers and gives no indi-
cation of any intent to restrict the government's ability to resort to
forfeiture provisions found in other statutes.
Of course, the protections afforded to owners and lienors were
noticeable additions when section 26 is compared to preprohibition
statutes. Moreover, they were additions of potential importance
because of the widespread use of automobiles to transport intoxi-
cating liquors.37 A principal impetus to the automobile boom of the
1920s was the rise of the installment sale system in which the pur-
chaser advanced a minimum cash down payment and paid the re-
mainder over an extended period.s Since a vast number of
33. S. REP. No. 151, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1919).
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. One indication of the importance of forfeitures as a method for enforcing prohibi-
tion is the number of seizures that occurred by 1930: 52,000 automobiles and 1,400 boats
along with other properties in the amount of $100,000,000. See Williams, Forfeiture Laws,
16 A.B.A.J. 572 (1930) (quoting speech by general counsel of the Prohibition Bureau); Note,
Forfeiture of Offending Vehicle Under Revenue and Prohibition Law-A Conflict in Stat-
utes, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 1039 (1930).
38. See generally D. BOORSrIN, THE AMEmmCANs: THE DEMOCRAIC EXPERIENCE 422-27
(1973). For a brief summary of some of the ways that the automobile influenced legal devel-




automobiles were financed in this fashion, 9 the protection that the
Volstead Act offered innocent owners and lienors effectively al-
lowed bootleggers to limit their forfeiture exposure to the small eq-
uity they were required to maintain in the car.
One question the Volstead Act did not expressly resolve was
whether those charged with enforcing prohibition could continue
to rely on the forfeiture provisions of the revenue and customs
statutes if the conduct charged fit under one of those statutes as
well as under section 26. Section 35 of Title II repealed provisions
of other laws inconsistent with the Volstead Act but "only to the
extent of such inconsistency. ' 40 It also provided that the Act's reg-
ulation of those engaged in the manufacture and trafficking of in-
toxicating liquor was to be "construed as in addition to existing
laws" and that the Act did "not relieve anyone from paying any
taxes or other charges imposed on the manufacture or traffic in
such [intoxicating] liquor." 41 However, the section did forbid issu-
ance of any "revenue stamps or tax receipts for any illegal manu-
facture or sale" of liquor "in advance"; instead, it imposed on per-
sons responsible for illegal manufacture or sale of intoxicating
liquor liability for a tax with an additional penalty of $500 on re-
tail dealers and $1,000 on manufacturers." 42 Moreover, the section
declared that payment of this tax and penalty gave "no right to
engage in the manufacture and sale of [intoxicating] liquor," nor
did it "relieve anyone of criminal liability. ' 43 Indeed, the section
provided that nothing in the Volstead Act "relieve[d] any person
from any liability, civil or criminal, heretofore or hereafter in-
curred under existing laws."
44
Left unanswered by section 35 was the question of whether
government prosecutors could use the harsher forfeiture provisions
of the revenue and customs statutes in prohibition cases, or
whether section 26 with its protections for innocent owners and
lienors was the exclusive vehicle for all liquor forfeitures. Nothing
in the legislative history indicated that Congress ever considered
39. McDonald, Automobile Forfeiture and the Eighteenth Amendment, 10 T x. L.
REv. 140, 142-43 (1931).
40. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 317 (1919).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 317-18.




the possibility of a conflict,45 and so the issue was left to the
courts. This problem was, in fact, the central doctrinal dilemma
faced by the judiciary in prohibition forfeiture cases, and the Su-
preme Court struggled with it throughout the prohibition era. The
sections that follow trace and evaluate the path of doctrinal devel-
opment on this and related forfeiture issues.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S FORFEITURE DECISIONS
A. Encouragement at the Outset of Prohibition
Although the Supreme Court did not decide a forfeiture case
arising under the eighteenth amendment during the first five years
of prohibition, a January 1921 decision in a case involving a 1918
seizure of intoxicating liquor upheld a forfeiture of the interest of
an innocent property owner under section 3450.4' The effect of this
holding was to encourage government prosecutors to use the gen-
eral revenue statutes so as to avoid the restrictive provisions con-
tained in section 26 of the Volstead Act. However, another decision
in the same term held that section 35 of the Volstead Act repealed
the preprohibition criminal provisions punishing the failure to pay
liquor taxes.47 The result created confusion as to the availability of
the general forfeiture provisions in liquor cases, and the confusion
persisted throughout the first half decade of prohibition.
J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. v. United States48 involved a seizure in
1918 of an automobile being used to transport intoxicating liquor.
The government moved to require forfeiture of the automobile
under section 3450, which authorized forfeitures of property used
to remove, deposit, or conceal goods on which a tax was due. The
Grant Company intervened in the forfeiture action alleging that it
held title to the automobile being forfeited and that it had had no
notice of the illegal use to which the automobile was being put.
Rejecting both constitutional and statutory arguments, the Su-
preme Court affirmed that the tax statute could and did forfeit the
45. Neither the House report nor the Senate report discussed in detail the provision
that became section 35. H.R. REP. No. 91, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-10 (1919); S. REP. No. 151,
66th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-20 (1919). Indeed, the possibility of a conflict between §§ 26 and 35
never surfaced in the individualized consideration of the two sections in either body. See 58
CONG. REc. 2902-05, 2963, 4847, 4850 (1919).
46. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
47. United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921).
48. 254 U.S. at 505.
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interest of the innocent property owners. The primary basis for the
Goldsmith holding was an appeal to authority; nineteenth century
cases like Dobbin's Distillery,9 the Court declared, had fixed sec-
tion 3450 "too firmly . . . in the punitive and remedial jurispru-
dence of the country" for it to be displaced.50
Despite this reliance on precedent and the Court's description
of the property owner's argument as "formidable" when considered
in the abstract,51 at least three aspects of the Goldsmith opinion
suggest the Court regarded the forfeiture device as a reasonable
restriction of property rights. First, the Court underscored the im-
portance of the governmental interest served by forfeiture. By en-
acting revenue measures, Congress "was faced with the necessity of
making provision against their violation, and the ways and means
of violation or evasion. ' 52 Since "some forms of property [were]
facilities" for breaching revenue provisions, Congress sought to in-
terpose "the care and responsibility of their owners in aid of the
prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, by ascribing to
the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt
in the wrong."' 53 Second, the Goldsmith opinion emphasized that
the forfeiture concept was one that could be reasonably confined.
Acknowledging hypothetical examples of extreme injustice-like
the forfeiture of a Pullman sleeper because a passenger takes a
bottle of illicit liquor aboard, the Court noted that no such appli-
cations had arisen in the half century of experience with the forfei-
ture law.54 The Court concluded, therefore, that the hypotheticals
could be adequately resolved when situations raising them were
presented.5 5 Third, the Court noted the "adaptability" of the auto-
mobile forfeited in Goldsmith to the illegal uses the forfeiture stat-
ute was designed to prevent.58 The automobile was "a thing that
can be used in the removal of 'goods and commodities' and the law
[was] explicit in its condemnation of such things. 57
From the viewpoint of federal prosecutors, the effect of the
49. 96 U.S. 395 (1878); see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
50. Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 511.
51. Id. at 510.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 512.
55. Id.




Goldsmith decision was to make section 3450 (and, implicitly,
other preprohibition forfeiture statutes) a far preferable forfeiture
provision to section 26 of the Volstead Act, because the latter sec-
tion afforded much greater protection to innocent owners and lien-
ors. 8 Unfortunately for the prosecutors, however, Goldsmith left
the crucial question unanswered: whether the government could
still use the general forfeiture provisions for seizures occurring af-
ter the eighteenth amendment and the Volstead Act became effec-
tive in 1920.
The Supreme Court did not address this issue for five years,
and lower federal courts in the interim reached conflicting conclu-
sions on the issue. At least part of the confusion in the lower court
decisions stemmed from uncertainty on a related but distinct is-
sue-the question of whether the stricter criminal provisions of the
revenue laws59 were inconsistent with the Volstead Act and thus
repealed by section 3560 insofar as they applied to intoxicating li-
quors. Although technically distinguishable from the forfeiture is-
sue, a decision concerning criminal penalties was crucial with re-
spect to forfeiture authority because the forfeiture provisions of
the revenue and customs laws were generally found in the sections
establishing criminal penalties for tax violations."1
The 1921 decision in United States v. Yuginovich12 held that
Congress "did not intend to preserve the old penalties [of the reve-
nue laws] in addition to the specific provision for punishment...
in the Volstead Act."6 s The exact basis for the Court's holding is
58. For an explanation by the assistant attorney general in charge of prohibition en-
forcement of the government's preference for § 3450, see Willebrandt, The National Prohi-
bition Act in Its Relation to Section 3450, 34 CASE & CoM. 3 (1928).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921). The defendant in Yugi-
novich was charged with four violations of the revenue laws: unlawfully engaging in the
business of distilling in violation of Rev. Stat. § 3257; failing to keep a registry sign on the
premises of a distillery as required by Rev. Stat. § 3279; carrying on the business of distil-
ling without posting the bond required by Rev. Stat. § 3281; and unlawfully making a mash
in a building other than a licensed distillery in violation of Rev. Stat. § 3282. The first and
third of these offenses carried maximum penalties of a $500 fine and imprisonment for three
years; the second, a maximum penalty of a $500 fine; and the fourth, a maximum penalty of
a $5,000 fine and imprisonment for two years. By contrast, the Volstead Act's maximum
penalty for a first offense of unlawfully manufacturing intoxicating liquor was $1,000 or six
months imprisonment. Volstead Act, tit. 2, ch. 85, § 29, 41 Stat. 316 (1919).
60. See supra text accompanying note 40.
61. See Rev. Stat. § 3257.
62. 256 U.S. at 450.
63. Id. at 464.
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difficult to discern, but Justice Day's opinion seems to rely on two
factors: the Volstead Act's establishment of lesser penalties "prac-
tically covering the same acts" as those covered by the revenue
laws," and the "comprehensive" nature of the prohibitions found
in the eighteenth amendment and the Volstead Act.65 Thus, the
Court based its decision upon principles of statutory construction
rather than on constitutional limits to congressional power. C6n-
gress acted quickly to indicate its disapproval of the holding.
Less than one month after the Yuginovich decision, a House
committee reported a bill designed to overrule it, 6 and Congress
passed the new statute before the end of the year. Accordingly,
section 5 of the Willis-Campbell Act,67 which was signed into law
on November 23, 1921, continued in force "as to both beverage and
non-beverage liquor," all laws relating to the manufacture and tax-
ation of intoxicating liquor "that were in force when the [Volstead]
Act was enacted," except those that were "directly in conflict with
the [Volstead] Act or this Act."68 The new Act also made all taxes
and penalties imposed by section 35 of the Volstead Act collectible
"in the same manner and by the same procedure as other taxes on
the manufacture of or traffic in liquor." 9 The Willis-Campbell Act
did require, however, the government to choose whether to prose-
cute under the revenue laws or the Volstead Act by providing that
if any activity was a violation of both the revenue laws and the
prohibition laws, "a conviction for such act or offense under one
[would] be a bar to prosecution therefor under the other."70
In United States v. Stafoff, 71 the Supreme Court held that
section 5 of the Willis-Campbell Act achieved its objective of over-
ruling Yuginovich. Accordingly, as to violations committed after
the passage of the new Act, reliance on Yuginovich was misplaced.
The new statute had re-established the criminal penalties of the
revenue laws that were in effect before the Volstead Act was
passed.
In view of this confusion over the continuing validity of reve-
64. Id. at 463.
65. Id. at 459-60.
66. H.R. REP. No. 224, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921).
67. Willis-Campbell Act, ch. 134, § 5, 42 Stat. 223 (1921).
68. Id. at 223.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 260 U.S. 477 (1923).
1983]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
nue provisions relating to intoxicating liquor, it is hardly surprising
that one can discern considerable disagreement in the lower fed-
eral courts as to whether section 26 was the sole procedure for
forfeiting illicit liquor and the conveyances in which the liquor was
transported, or whether the government could also rely on the gen-
eral forfeiture provisions of the revenue laws.7 2 The reported deci-
sions of the district courts were sharply divided. A majority ac-
cepted the argument that the provisions of the general forfeiture
statutes were not inconsistent with those of section 26 and allowed
recourse to the general statutes.7 3 However, even some of those
that permitted liquor forfeitures under the general statutes nar-
rowly construed those statutes to distinguish them from section
6, and a substantial minority ruled that the government had to
follow the section 26 procedures, especially when the government
had named that section as one basis for its forfeiture authority.75
72. See generally Note, Application of Internal Revenue Laws to Forfeitures of Vehi-
cles Used in Transporting Intoxicating Liquors, 11 VA. L. REV. 628, 632-33 (1925); cf. Buck-
ley, Forfeiture of Vehicles for Unlawful Movement of Liquor: Under the National Prohibi-
tion Act-Under the Revised Statutes, 4 B.U.L. REV. 183, 185 (1924) ("weight of authority
seems to be drifting toward the theory that 3450 has not been repealed"); see also Note,
Forfeiture of Property of Innocent Owners Used in Transporting Liquor, 74 U. PA. L. REV.
170 (1925).
73. See United States v. One Marmon Automobile, 5 F.2d 113 (N.D. Ga. 1925); United
States v. One White One-Ton Truck, 4 F.2d 413 (W.D. Wash. 1925); United States v. One
Ford Coupe, 3 F.2d 64 (W.D. La. 1924); United States v. One Ford Automobile, 1 F.2d 654
(E.D. Tenn. 1924); United States v. 385 Barrels, etc., of Wine, 300 F. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1924);
United States v. One Cadillac Automobile, 292 F. 773 (E.D. IMI. 1923); The Cherokee, 292 F.
212 (S.D. Tex. 1923); Reo Atlanta Co. v. Stern, 279 F. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1922); The Tuscan, 276
F. 55 (S.D. Ala. 1921); United States v. One Essex Touring Automobile, 276 F. 28 (N.D. Ga.
1921); United States v. One Cole Aero Eight Automobile, 273 F. 934 (D. Mont. 1921);
United States v. One Essex Touring Automobile, 266 F. 138 (N.D. Ga. 1920). For similar
decisions with respect to the forfeiture provisions of the customs and navigation laws, see
The Amriold, 6 F.2d 413 (D.R.L 1925); United States v. One Durant Touring Car, 2 F.2d
478 (W.D. Tex. 1924); United States v. Two Automobiles & Five Cases of Whiskey, 2 F.2d
264 (S.D. Cal. 1924); United States v. One Ford Automobile, 292 F. 207 (S.D. Tex. 1923).
74. See United States v. One Buick Sedan, 1 F.2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 1924); United States v.
One Buick Automobile, 300 F. 584 (S.D. Cal. 1924); cf. United States v. One Buick Roadster,
280 F. 517 (D. Mont. 1922) (concerning the refusal to forfeit an automobile under Rev. Stat.
§ 3450 when the vehicle was being used by a trespasser and neither the owner nor his bailee
had authorized the use).
75. See, e.g., The Maberhex, 6 F.2d 415 (D.R.I. 1924); The Spray, 6 F.2d 414 (D.R.I.
1925). Other decisions reached similar results even though the government did not name §
26. See United States v. Three Quarts of Whiskey, 9 F.2d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1925); United
States v. One Chevrolet Coupe, 9 F.2d 85 (E.D. Mo. 1925); United States v. Deutsch, 8 F.2d
54 (E.D. Mo. 1925); United States v. One Packard Motor Truck, 284 F. 394 (E.D. Mich.
1922); cf. United States v. Torres, 291 F. 138 (D. Md. 1923) (prosecution under the Volstead
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In contrast, the decisions of the federal courts of appeals were
virtually unanimous in refusing to allow prosecutors to use the
general forfeiture provision as an alternative to section 26.76 De-
spite the uniformity of the result, the appellate courts applied a
variety of rationales, 7 and the Ninth Circuit sought to clarify the
scope of the government's forfeiture authority by certifying to the
Supreme Court a list of six questions regarding that authority in
liquor forfeiture cases. 78 Together with the Court's grant of certio-
Act amounts to an election to use the forfeiture provisions of § 26); United States v. One
Hudson Touring Car, 274 F. 473 (E.D. Mich. 1921), aff'd, 284 F. 821 (6th Cir. 1922) (post-
Yuginovich decision holding that the forfeiture provisions within § 3450 were repealed as to
transportation of intoxicating liquors by subsequent passage of the inconsistent provisions
of § 26).
76. See United States v. One Reo Truck Automobile, 9 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1925); Marom
Atlanta Co. v. United States, 8 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1925); United States v. Milstone, 6 F.2d
481 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Commercial Credit Co. v. United States, 5 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1925); One
Big-Six Studebaker Automobile v. United States, 289 F. 256 (9th Cir. 1923); McDowell v.
United States, 286 F. 521 (9th Cir. 1923); One Ford Touring Car v. United States, 284 F. 823
(8th Cir. 1922); United States v. Federal Ins. Co., 284 F. 821 (6th Cir. 1922); Lewis v. United
States, 280 F. 5 (6th Cir. 1922); United States v. One Haynes Automobile, 274 F. 926 (5th
Cir. 1921); cf. National Bond & Inv. Co. v. United States, 8 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1925) (post
Willis-Campbell Act decision holding that intent to defraud the United States, an essential
element for forfeiture under § 3450, could not be inferred from mere use of vehicle to trans-
port intoxicating liquor within the United States). But cf. Payne v. United States, 279 F.
112 (5th Cir. 1922) (forfeiture of vehicle under § 3450 permissible when evidence justified
inference that the liquor being transported had been manufactured before the Volstead Act
was passed).
77. Compare, e.g., United States v. One Reo Truck Automobile, 9 F.2d 529 (2d Cir.
1925) (provisions of § 26 inconsistent with those of Rev. Stat. § 3450), with Commercial
Credit Co. v. United States, 5 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1925) (passage of the Willis-Campbell Act did
not revive preexisting taxes on intoxicating liquor because those taxes directly conflicted
with the Volstead Act's prohibition on the issuance of liquor taxes). Several of the circuit
court decisions had limited precedential value because they concerned incidents arising
before the Willis-Campbell Act overruled Yuginovich. See, e.g., One Ford Touring Car v.
United States, 284 F. 823 (8th Cir. 1922); United States v. Federal Ins. Co., 284 F. 821 (6th
Cir. 1922); Lewis v. United States, 280 F. 5 (6th Cir. 1922).
78. Certificate of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 2-3, Port
Gardner Inv. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 564 (1926). These were the six questions certi-
fied by the court of appeals:
(1) Is Section 3450 of the Revised Statutes of the United States in force and
effect in so far as it provides for the forfeiture of automobiles or other vehicles
where the same are used or are being used for the transportation of intoxicating
liquor?
(2) Do the provisions of Section 3450 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States authorize the forfeiture of the interest of a conditional vendor reserving
title to a conveyance who is free from knowledge, blame or negligence in the
premises where the goods or commodities concerned consist of intoxicating li-
quors illicitly manufactured or imported, a case under the Section referred to
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rari to the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Garth Motor Com-
pany,7 this certification provided the occasion for the Supreme
Court's initial attempt, in the second half of the 1920s, to reconcile
section 26 with the general forfeiture provisions.
B. Equivocation in the Second Half of the Decade
After Goldsmith, the Supreme Court did not consider any for-
feiture questions until November 1926 when it handed down a se-
ries of four forfeiture opinions. Considered as a group, the thrust
of these opinions was equivocal. Three favored the government in
that they confirmed the existence of a broad power to forfeit prop-
erty used to carry intoxicating liquor, declined to allow a proce-
dural irregularity to invalidate a prohibition forfeiture, and refused
to require the federal government to initiate all prohibition forfeit-
ures under section 26 of the Volstead Act. The fourth opinion in
the group limited the government's ability to resort to the general
forfeiture provisions. It imposed an election requirement that
forced the government to proceed under section 26 whenever it
convicted the party in control of the property of violating the
transportation provisions of the Volstead Act.
Van Oster v. Kansas"0 involved a state prohibition statute
being made out in other respects?
(3) Does Section 3450 of the Revised Statutes authorize the forfeiture of tax-
able goods or commodities and the carriage or other conveyance used in the re-
moval or for the deposit or concealment thereof where the only removal, deposit
or concealment with intent to defraud the United States of such tax that can be
shown is the mere movement of such goods on a trip other than from the origi-
nal point of importation, manufacturing or bonded warehousing?
(4) In the State of Washington, where there is no place where intoxicating
liquor can be legally kept without the tax thereon being paid or otherwise, can
an automobile be said to have been guilty of being used for the removal, deposit
or concealment of intoxicating liquor with intent to defraud the government of
the tax imposed thereon where it is merely shown that the liquor is found in the
automobile and that no tax thereon has been paid?
(5) Did the prosecution of the driver of the car under the National Prohibi-
tion Act constitute an election by the government to proceed under Section 26 of
that Act and thereby prevent the forfeiture of the car under Section 3450 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States?
(6) Is there any tax on intoxicating liquor illicitly manufactured as the word
tax is meant and used in Section 3450 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States or are the so-called taxes now claimed to be collectable merely penalties?
79. 4 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1925), reu'd, 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
80. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
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rather than the Volstead Act, but the opinion is significant for the
Court's emphatic reaffirmation of the constitutionality of forfeiting
the property of an innocent owner. Pursuant to a Kansas prohibi-
tion statute providing for the forfeiture of vehicles used to trans-
port intoxicating liquor, Van Oster's automobile was forfeited even
though he did not know the vehicle was being used illegally. Not-
ing that Goldsmith and other decisions held statutory forfeitures
of the interest of innocent owners and lien holders under the reve-
nue laws did not violate the fifth amendment's guarantee of due
process, Justice Stone's majority opinion refused to find that "the
police power of the state in this field" was not as plenary as the
federal government's taxing power.81 Acknowledging that the Kan-
sas statute offered the innocent property owner less protection
than did the federal enforcement act, the Court declared that that
difference did not render the state law unconstitutional.
82
In an opinion issued on the same day as Van Oster, a sharply
divided Court indicated that section 26 was not the exclusive pro-
cedure for liquor related forfeitures and that the government could
rely upon section 3450 in some situations. Reversing the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in Garth Motor Co.,8s Justice Brandeis' comprehen-
sive opinion in United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile"
81. Id. at 468. In the early years of national prohibition, several state courts had con-
strued state prohibition laws to forfeit the interests of innocent property owners. See, e.g.,
Black, Some Prohibition Cases-The Doctrine of Vicarious Liability, 78 U. PA. L. Rv. 518,
518-20, 522-23 (1930); Recent Decisions, Intoxicating Liquors-Illegal Transportation-For-
feiture, 20 COLUM. L. Rav. 798 (1920-21); Recent Cases: Constitutional Law-Due Process
of Law-Rights of Innocent Owner Under Statutory Forfeiture, 34 HARV. L. Rav. 212
(1920). But see Recent Decisions: Intoxicating Liquors-Forfeiture of Vehicles in Which
Liquor is Being Illegally Transported, 8 VA. L. Rav. 59 (1921) (discussing North Carolina
decision to the contrary).
82. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 469.
83. United States v. Garth Motor Co., 4 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1925).
84. 272 U.S. 321 (1926). Justice Stone filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Butler
dissented in an opinion that Justices McReynolds and Sutherland joined. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Stone argued "that there conceivably may be a deposit or concealment of
illicit liquor in an automobile with intent to deprive the United States of the tax upon it,
which is not transportation within the meaning of § 26 and to that extent the two statutes
are not in conflict." He refused, however, to "subscribe to those expressions in the opinion
which seem to suggest that the two sections are not in direct conflict, in a case where there
is transportation of liquor in violation of the [Volstead Act] with intent to defraud the
United States of the tax." Id. at 335.
Justice Butler dissented on three grounds. First, he argued that the eighteenth amend-
ment repealed all taxes relating to intoxicating liquor. As a result, § 3450 could not apply.
Id. at 335-41. Second, he contended that a direct conflict existed between § 26 and § 3450 in
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first affirmed that the Volstead Act, as amended by the Willis-
Campbell Act, imposed a tax on illicitly manufactured liquor.85 It
then rejected the argument that this tax was actually a penalty88
and refused to accept a narrow construction of the revenue stat-
ute's forfeiture provision. Finally, it turned to the central issue:
whether section 26 of the Volstead Act superseded section 3450 in-
sofar as it applied to forfeitures involving intoxicating liquor.
The Court concluded that section 26 did not supersede section
3450 because "[tihe two statutes cover different grounds" and
"[d]ifferent purposes underlay their enactment." 88 The Court
noted that while many acts punishable under section 3450 were
also punishable under section 26, "many [were] not."8 With re-
spect to this last point, the Court offered three examples: First,
section 3450 applied "to a vehicle, whether used for removal, de-
posit, or concealment, and even [though] the vehicle [was] not in
motion and movement was never contemplated"; in contrast, sec-
tion 26 "applie[d] only to a vehicle used in transporting contrary
to law." 90 Second, section 3450 might "apply although a permit
was obtained to transport the liquor; [section] 26 [could] not."91
Third, section 3450 "as applied to liquor relate[d] only to that on
which taxes have not been paid; [section] 26 applie[d] whether
taxes have been paid or not. '9 2
Finally, the Court declined to decide on the record before it
whether section 26 required an election to proceed under the Vol-
stead Act or under the revenue laws, or whether the institution of
criminal proceedings under section 26 barred recourse to section
3450.93 The Court found that section 26 applied "only if a person is
discovered in the act of transporting intoxicating liquor in viola-
all cases where liquor was being transported because § 26 protected innocent property own-
ers and § 3450 did not. Id. at 341-43. Third, he concluded that the record before the court
was sufficient to demonstrate that the vehicle involved was being used to transport intoxi-
cating liquor when it was seized. Id. at 344-50.
85. Id. at 326-27.
86. Id. at 328-29.
87. Id. at 329-30.
88. Id. at 330.
89. Id. at 331.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 331.
93. Id. at 334.
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tion of law,"'94 and the libel in the record contained no allegations
"that the automobile had been so discovered or was being so
used," or that the person in possession of the automobile had even
been arrested.9 5 Thus, the libel was adequate to withstand a mo-
tion to quash.
The Court's 1926 decisions also indicated a reluctance to avoid
forfeitures for minor procedural irregularities. On the day following
the decision in One Ford Coupe, the Court in Dodge v. United
States98 upheld a forfeiture under section 26 of the Volstead Act
even though municipal police officers rather than, prohibition
agents had made the initial seizure of the motor boat that was be-
ing forfeited and even though "when the vessel was handed over to
the prohibition director, the liquor was no longer aboard and...
the man arrested was not present. '9 7 Justice Holmes' characteristi-
cally brief opinion applied the normal forfeiture rules that "anyone
may seize any property for forfeiture to the government and that if
the government adopts the act and proceeds to enforce the forfei-
ture by legal process, this is of no less validity than when the
seizure is by authority originally given."98 The opinion emphasized
that the owner suffered "nothing that he would not have suffered if
the seizure had been authorized." 99 However the seizure was ef-
fected, it brought "the object within the power of the court...
and justice to the owner is as safe in the one as in the other."100
The fourth opinion in 1926 forced the Court to analyze the
election of remedies issue that One Ford Coupe had declined to
reach. Port Gardner Investment Co. v. United States01 involved
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 272 U.S. 530 (1926); see also United States v. One Reo Motor Truck, 6 F.2d 412
(D.R.I. 1925), noted in, 74 U. PA. L. Rv. 196 (1925).
97. 272 U.S. at 531.
98. Id. at 532 (citing The Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 100 (1819)).
99. 272 U.S. at 532.
100. Id.
101. 272 U.S. 564 (1926). Justice Butler filed a concurring opinion that Justice Stone
joined. Justice Butler would have answered the certified question as submitted by the Ninth
Circuit without limiting the holding to a case where the defendant had been convicted
under the Volstead Act. He gave the following explanation for his position:
The substance of [the question left unanswered by the Court] is whether the
prohibition officer discovering one in the act of transporting may disregard the
plain and direct commands of [section] 26 to proceed against the vehicle as there
directed. I think he has no more right to ignore that command than he has to let
the liquor and offender go. The law makes the election.
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the Ninth Circuit's certification of six questions designed to clarify
the government's forfeiture authority in prohibition cases, 102 but
the Supreme Court declined the invitation to issue a comprehen-
sive opinion explaining the relationship between section 26 of the
Volstead Act and section 3450. Although the Court did rule that
the government had to proceed under section 26 of the Volstead
Act in the case before it, the Port Gardner opinion carefully con-
fined itself to the issue necessary to resolve that case. As a result,
the Supreme Court answered only one of the six questions pro-
pounded by the Ninth Circuit, and it answered even that question
in terms more restrictive than those in which the question had
been asked.103
The driver of the car involved in Port Gardner had pleaded
guilty to unlawful possession and transportation of intoxicating li-
quor, and the Court seized on his conviction as the crucial factor
requiring the government to use the forfeiture procedures of sec-
tion 26. Once the driver had been convicted, the Court declared,
section 26 mandated forfeiture under its provisions.1 0 4 Since the
disposition required by section 26 was inconsistent with forfeiture
under the general forfeiture statute,105 the government could not
resort to the latter section.
As might have been anticipated, the cautious response in Port
Gardner, when combined with One Ford Coupe's ambiguous en-
dorsement of the use of the general forfeiture statutes in some
cases, tended to stimulate litigation to determine exactly when the
government had to proceed under section 26 rather than the gen-
eral forfeiture statutes. To clarify the issue, the Court returned to
the election issue two years later in Commercial Credit Co. v.
United States,10 6 and the new decision expanded the Port Gardner
Id. at 567.
102. The certified questions are quoted in note 78 supra.
103. The Ninth Circuit's fifth question asked whether prosecution of the driver under
the Volstead Act amounted to an election to proceed under § 26. The Supreme Court an-
swered that disposition of the car under § 26 was mandatory once the driver had been con-
victed. Point Gardner, 272 U.S. at 556.
104. Id. at 566. The Court specifically declined to "determine whether mere commence-
ment of a proceeding under § 26 constitutes an election." Id.
105. Id. The Court did not explain what inconsistencies rendered the two acts incom-
patible. Presumably it was the protection that § 26 afforded innocent owners but Rev. Stat.
§ 3450 did not.
106. 276 U.S. 226 (1928), noted in Recent Cases, Intoxicating Liquors-Election of
Remedies-Right to Proceed Against Driver Under National Prohibition Act and Against
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rule slightly to make it applicable when the driver had only been
convicted of illegal possession of intoxicating liquor.
107
The unanimous opinion in Commercial Credit continued to
define the issue narrowly. Although the parties had tried to phrase
the question in terms of whether section 26 afforded an exclusive
remedy "whenever an officer discover[ed] a person in the act of
transporting intoxicating liquor in a vehicle," the Court refused to
reach that issue in view of the driver's conviction for unlawful pos-
session. 108 Emphasizing that the possession conviction followed the
driver's "arrest when discovered in the act of transportation," the
Court concluded that this conviction was sufficient to make the
forfeiture provisions of section 26 mandatory.109 According to the
Court, section 26, when read in its entirety, governed the disposi-
tion of any vehicle "when the person in charge of the vehicle is
convicted of the unlawful possession incidental to the transporta-
tion, as well as where he is convicted of the transportation it-
self."1110 Thus, the Port Gardner rule applied once the driver had
been convicted, and it required the government to use the forfei-
ture provisions of section 26.
Commercial Ctedit was the last Supreme Court forfeiture de-
cision of the 1920s. Along with the other decisions of the second
half of the decade, it displayed the pattern typical of the Supreme
Court's prohibition decisions in the middle years of prohibition -
a willingness to temper the zeal of prosecutors by narrow construc-
tion but an unwillingness to articulate bold doctrines that would
challenge the government's basic ability to enforce prohibition.1
Thus, the law of forfeiture was left in an uncertain state, providing
little guidance for lower federal courts.
The best evidence of the Court's failure to offer clear guidance
is the confusion among the lower federal courts on the issue the
Supreme Court declined to reach in Port Gardner and Commercial
Credit. The Fifth Circuit concluded that arresting the person in
Vehicle Under Internal Revenue Law, 41 HRv. L. REv. 676 (1928).
107. 276 U.S. at 232.
108. Id. at 233.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See generally Murchison, supra note 8, at 477-78. Dissents also become more com-
mon in cases like One Ford Coupe, 3 F.2d at 654, where the Court decided in favor of the,
government. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in Katz v.
U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1969); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
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charge of a vehicle and charging him with a violation of the Vol-
stead Act was sufficient to make the section 26 procedures
mandatory.112 In contrast, the Fourth113 and Ninth11 4 Circuits
ruled that the government could proceed under the general forfei-
ture statute so long as the government did not prosecute the per-
son in charge for violating the Volstead Act. As a result of this
split, the Supreme Court had to return again to the issue in the
last years of the prohibition era.
C. The Final Years: Expanding and Limiting the Election
Doctrine
As public dissatisfaction with prohibition increased after 1930,
the Supreme Court expanded the election doctrine announced in
Port Gardner and Commercial Credit. The new doctrine required
all transportation cases to proceed under section 26 of the Volstead
Act rather than section 3450. Even at this point in the history of
prohibition, however, the Court continued to allow prosecutors to
use general forfeiture statutes in two classes of cases: forfeitures of
furnishings used in establishments selling intoxicating liquor and
forfeitures of vehicles and vessels violating customs and naviga-
tions laws.
In Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States,11 5 the Court re-
viewed the decisions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits allowing the
government to proceed under section 3450, where the person in
charge of the vehicle had been initially arrested for transporting
intoxicating liquor in violation of the Volstead Act. Reversing both
judgments, the Court broadened the election doctrine to encom-
pass the rule the claimant in Port Gardner had originally urged:
arrest alone was held sufficient to require the government to use
the forfeiture provisions of section 26.
In each of the cases consolidated for review Richbourg, a per-
112. United States v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 25 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1928).
113. Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 34 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1929), rev'd, 281 U.S.
528 (1930); see also United States v. Commercial Credit Co., 20 F.2d 519 (4th Cir. 1927).
114. Davies Motor Co. v. United States, 35 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1929), rev'd sub nom.
Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528 (1930).
115. 281 U.S. 528 (1930), noted in Recent Cases, Internal Revenue-Forfeiture of Au-
tomobile Transporting Intoxicating Liquors-Effect on Innocent Lien Holder, 3 U. CIN. L.
REv. 483 (1929); Recent Cases: Intoxicating Liquors-Mandatory Forfeiture Under the Na-
tional Prohibition Act to Protect Innocent Third Parties, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1930).
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son driving an automobile belonging to another had been arrested
and arraigned on a charge of illegal transportation of intoxicating
liquor, and the officer making the arrest had seized the liquor in
the automobile used to transport it. The cases were, however, dis-
tinguishable from Port Gardner and Commercial Credit because
neither Richbourg defendant had been convicted of violating the
Volstead Act. In both cases federal prosecutors chose not to pro-
ceed with the original charges. Instead, they indicted and con-
victed the driver for removing and concealing spirits with intent to
defraud the government of the tax due on the spirits.'16 Following
these convictions, the prosecutors moved to forfeit the vehicles
under section 3450.
In holding these forfeitures impermissible, the Richbourg
opinion emphasized the mandatory form of the language used
throughout section 26. Literal compliance with this language would
"compel forfeiture under [section] 26," and if this disposition were
mandatory, the protection section 26 afforded to innocent lienors
would be "in direct conflict with the forfeiture provisions of [sec-
tion] 3450" and would supersede them in all situations to which
both statutes could apply.117
The government argued that the mandatory language should
not be interpreted literally. In the government's view, the phrasing
of section 26 "was not intended to do more than state generally the
duty resting on all law enforcement officers to enforce the law, but
which leaves them free when the same act or transaction consti-
tutes an offense under different statutes, to proceed under either
one."" 8 After conceding that the mandatory word "shall" could
sometimes mean "may" when "used in a statute prospectively af-
fecting governmental action,"" 9 the Court gave a number of rea-
sons for concluding that section 26 did not use "shall" in this fash-
ion. First, the detailed steps of section 26, which, "if followed, lead
unavoidably to forfeiture under that section and no other," sug-
gested a "definite purpose" to protect innocent owners in all for-
feitures of vehicles used to transport intoxicating liquor. 20 Second,
116. Richbourg, 281 U.S. at 531.
117. Id. at 533.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 534 (citing Railroad Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168 (1877)); West Wisconsin Ry.
Co. v. Foley, 94 U.S. 100 (1876).
120. Richbourg, 281 U.S. at 534.
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the contention urged by the government would allow the forfeiture
of the interest of innocent property owners "in practically every
case where a transporting vehicle is seized," a result inconsistent
with the congressional decision to protect innocent persons in pro-
hibition forfeitures. 121 Third, Port Gardner and Commercial
Credit had already held that the language of section 26 requiring
forfeiture upon conviction of the person in charge of the vehicle
was mandatory, and "[n]o tenable ground of distinction" existed
for holding "that the preceding requirement of the section, that
the proceeding against the person arrested 'shall be under the pro-
visions of this title,' [was] any less So. ''122
Noting that its conclusion was "not without support in the leg-
islative history of [section] 26,'123 the Court specifically mentioned
two items. When the clause protecting innocent lienors was added
in a House floor amendment, the amendment's sponsor indicated
that the purpose was "to save from forfeiture the interest of inno-
cent lienors and owners alike."11 2 ' Second, the Richbourg majority
referred to language in the Senate report on the Volstead Act
which declared that the Act authorized the seizure of vehicles be-
ing used to transport intoxicating liquor, with "the property seized
to be disposed of under the direction of the court as provided in
[section] 26."'125
The decision in Richbourg signaled an important practical
121. Id. at 535. The Court asserted, without any supporting authority, that Congress
knew "that the enactment of the National Prohibition Act would enormously increase
seizures of vehicles beyond those made under [section] 3450, and that their forfeiture would
place an increased and heavy burden on many innocent persons, unless afforded some pro-
tection by the new legislators." Id. Undoubtedly, forfeitures did increase greatly during the
prohibition era, see supra note 37, but little, if any, evidence exists to suggest that either
Congress or the prohibitionist lobbyists anticipated a vast number of forfeitures would be
necessary to enforce the Volstead Act. Cf. 59 CONG. REc. 5655 (1920) (letter from General
Counsel of Anti-Saloon League to Senator Morris Sheppard estimating that "five million a
year appropriated to enforce [the Volstead Act] would be ample").
122. Richbourg, 281 U.S. at 536.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 536 (citing 58 CONG. Rac. 2902 (1919) (statement of Rep. Lankford)).
125. Richbourg, 281 U.S. at 536 (citing S. Rep. No. 151, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1919)).
Since this portion of the report spoke in terms of the seizure being "authorized" rather than
"required," it provided little support for the Court's position. Moreover, the Court omitted
the verb "may" in describing the authority to seize a vehicle under § 26. Id. ("This section
... provides that when ... any officer discovers a person illegally transporting intoxicating
liquor in an automobile or in any other vehicle, he may seize the same and arrest the person
in charge") (emphasis added).
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change for those charged with enforcing prohibition. The earlier
cases of Port Gardner and Commercial Credit had emphasized a
prosecutorial election of remedies in obtaining the Volstead Act
conviction, an election requirement that found textual support in
the Willis-Campbell Act.128 In contrast, Richbourg effectively de-
nied the prosecutor any alternative by holding that all forfeitures
coming within the scope of section 26 of the Volstead Act had to
be effected under its procedures. Thus, as a practical matter, Rich-
bourg precluded the use of the general forfeiture provisions in the
very cases where they would have proved most useful: those involv-
ing the use of automobiles to carry intoxicating liquors.
Richbourg involved a significant rhetorical shift as well, for the
Court's opinion manifested a new solicitude for "innocent" prop-
erty owners. In construing section 26, the Court emphasized that
continued recourse to section 3450 after passage of the Volstead
Act "would place an increased and heavy burden on many inno-
cent persons. '12 It therefore concluded that Congress must have
intended the "carefully chosen language of section 26" to preclude
the imposition of that burden and to ensure that all "innocent
third persons" received the protections granted by section 26.128
Even though Richbourg precluded resort to section 3450 in
most automobile cases, it did not eliminate all dispute over the
scope of forfeiture authority in prohibition cases. Revenue and cus-
toms laws contained other forfeiture provisions, and a series of de-
cisions rendered in the October 1931 term confirmed that the fed-
eral government could still make prohibition related forfeitures
under several of those statutes.
United States v. Ryan, 29 the first in this group of decisions,
involved a seizure and forfeiture of "a bar, back bar, and other
126. An Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, ch. 134, 42 Stat. 222, 223
(1921). The first paragraph of § 5 "continue[d] in force" all laws relating to the manufacture
and taxation of and traffic in intoxicating liquor "except such provisions as [were] directly
in conflict with" the Volstead Act, but it barred conviction under more than one law when
the act charged was a violation of both the liquor laws and the Volstead Act. Under the
rationale of Richbourg, the government apparently could elect to prosecute a defendant
under the revenue laws. Choosing to prosecute under the revenue laws, however, would
eliminate the possibility of forfeiting the vehicle, since the Willis-Campbell Act forbade con-
viction under both laws, § 26 required a conviction before its provisions could be invoked,
and Richbourg precluded forfeiture under the general revenue laws.
127. Richbourg, 281 U.S. at 535.
128. Id.
129. 284 U.S. 167 (1931).
1983]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
saloon furnishings" at a "so-called soft-drink parlor, [which was] in
fact used for the sale of intoxicating liquor as beverages." 130 The
evidence at the forfeiture trial also established that "at the time
and place of seizure," the person in charge of the premises pos-
sessed and was selling liquor on which the required tax had not
been paid."'1 The authority alleged for forfeiture was section 3453
of the Revised Statutes,3 2 a general forfeiture provision. That sec-
tion contained three clauses, whose provisions were summarized by
the Supreme Court as follows:
The first authorizes forfeiture of taxable "articles" found in the possession,
custody or control of any person "for the purpose of being sold or removed by
him in fraud of the internal revenue laws." The second authorizes forfeiture
of "raw materials found in the possession of any person intending to manu-
facture the same into articles of a kind subject to tax," with intent to defraud
the revenue. The third forfeits "all tools, implements, instruments, and per-
sonal property whatsoever, in the place or building, or within any yard or
inclosure where such articles or raw materials are found."'13
The bulk of the Ryan opinion explained the Court's rejection
of Ryan's argument that section 3453 did not authorize seizure of
his furnishings because the term "such articles" in the third clause
referred only to those described in the second (i.e., taxable articles
manufactured on the premises) and did not encompass those de-
scribed in the first clause (i.e., any taxable articles possessed for
the purpose of being sold in fraud of the revenue laws). Relying on
130. Id. at 170-71.
131. Id. at 170.
132. Rev. Stat. § 3453 reads as follows:
All goods, wares, merchandise, articles, or objects, on which taxes are im-
posed, which shall be found in the possession, or custody, or within the control
of any person, for the purpose of being sold or removed by him in fraud of the
internal revenue law, or with design to avoid payment of said taxes, may be
seized by the collector or deputy collector of the proper district, or by such other
collector or deputy collector as may be specially authorized by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue for that purpose, and shall be forfeited to the United States.
And all raw materials found in the possession of any person intending to manu-
facture the same into articles of a kind subject to tax for the purpose of fraudu-
lently selling such manufactured articles, or with design to evade the payment of
said tax; and all tools, implements, instruments, and personal property whatso-
ever, in the place or building, or within any yard or inclosure where such articles
or raw materials are found, may also be seized by any collector or deputy collec-
tor, as aforesaid, and shall be forfeited as aforesaid. The proceedings to enforce
such forfeitures shall be in the nature of a proceeding in rem in the circuit court
or district court of the United States for the district where such seizure is made.
133. Ryan, 284 U.S. at 171-72.
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the legislative history and "the uniform construction given to the
section with respect to this question by the lower federal courts for
more than sixty years,"1 " the Supreme Court concluded the "arti-
cles," as used in the third clause referred to the articles described
in either of the two preceding clauses.
Ryan avoided an overly broad construction of the section by
limiting the language allowing forfeiture of "all. . . personal prop-
erty in the building where the article was sold to include only those
chattels," which were "related to one or the other of the principal
things, or incident to their intended use or disposition in fraud of
the revenue. '13 5 Applying this standard to the articles seized in
Ryan (the furnishings and equipment of a room in which intoxicat-
ing liquors were dispensed), the Court concluded these chattels
were subject to forfeiture because they "were incident to the sale"
of the liquor and "were so related to the tax evasion at which the
statute was aimed as to be clearly embraced within both its pur-
pose and words." 3 "
After deciding that the revenue forfeiture statute applied, the
Court dismissed in a single paragraph the suggestion that arrest
and prosecution of the person in control of the furnishings under
the Volstead Act barred the forfeiture.1 87 The Richbourg doctrine
was inapplicable, the Court said, because section 26 of the Vol-
stead Act, on which it was based, only covered forfeitures of vehi-
cles used to transport intoxicating liquor. Consequently, nothing in
the Volstead Act was "necessarily or directly in conflict with the
application given [in Ryan] to the provisions of § 3453. ''138
Later in the same term, the Court turned to a set of forfeitures
less easily distinguished from Richbourg, those in which vehicles
and vessels carrying intoxicating liquors were forfeited for violating
customs and navigation laws. These decisions held that the Rich-
bourg requirement that liquor forfeitures proceed under section 26
did not apply when the conduct leading to the forfeiture violated
customs or navigation laws. Thus, General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. United States"39 held that section 26 did not repeal the
134. Id. at 174.
135. Id. at 176.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 176-77.
138. Id.
139. 286 U.S. 49 (1932). A companion decision applied the General Motors distinction
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forfeiture provisions of the customs laws in liquor importation and
transportation cases. In each of the four cases consolidated in Gen-
eral Motors, customs officers had discovered liquor in an automo-
bile crossing the Mexican border at an official stopping point of the
customs service. The officers arrested the drivers for violating the
Tariff Act of 1930140 by "unlawfully importing liquor into the
United States, and knowingly concealing and facilitating the trans-
portation of such liquor, 141 and they seized the vehicles carrying
the liquor. The defendants subsequently pleaded guilty to the im-
portation charge,142 and the United States Attorney initiated for-
feiture proceedings under sections of the customs laws that did not
protect the interest of innocent owners.143
Based on the apparently unchallenged premise that the defen-
dants could properly be convicted for violating the criminal provi-
sions of the Tariff Act, even though their conduct also violated the
Volstead Act,144 the General Motors majority concluded that the
government could choose the forfeiture provision on which it pre-
ferred to rely. It expressly declined the invitation to "hold that
prosecution of the offender may be based at the election of the
Government either on the one act or on the other,. . . [and] that
forfeiture of the implements used in his offending may be based on
only one of them," because such a holding would "withdraw from
the tariff acts [sic] remedies and sanctions existing for the better
part of the century."'1 45
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Cardozo emphasized
that the Volstead Act itself recognized a distinction between im-
portation and transportation. Section 26 was, however, directed
only against transportation, "though the conduct that it does cover
to a situation where the evidence of the automobiles used in smuggling was more equivocal.
United States v. Commercial Credit Co., 286 U.S. 63 (1932), upheld a forfeiture under the
customs statute where the evidence "justifies a finding that the cars... were implements or
links in a continuous process carriage from Mexico into [the United States]," although it did
not indicate clearly whether the cars that were seized were loaded on the American or Mexi-
can side of the border. Id. at 67.
140. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 639.
141. General Motors, 286 U.S. at 54.
142. Other counts charging failures to obtain a permit, to pay duties, and to make entry
at the custom house were dismissed. Id.
143. Rev. Stat. §§ 3061, 3062; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.




may be an incident of smuggling,"1 4 and separate provisions in the
customs laws authorized forfeitures in cases of unlawful importa-
tion. As a result of these separate authorizations, the government
had a choice when the same conduct constituted illegal transporta-
tion and unlawful importation; it could elect to seize and forfeit
the property under the customs laws or under the Volstead Act.
The choice, the Court emphasized, was one "for the govern-
ment."14 7 Neither the owner of the property nor the offender had
"the privilege of choice between forfeiture upon the footing of the
illegal transportation and forfeiture upon the footing of a smuggled
importation."14 8
Justice Cardozo gave two reasons for refusing to extend Rich-
bourg to the importation cases. First, the arrest and arraignment of
the operator of the Richbourg vehicle on a charge of illegal trans-
portation represented "a clear election to go forward under the
provisions of the prohibition act, and not under any other.' 4 9 Sec-
ond, the revenue violation alleged in Richbourg-moving intoxicat-
ing liquor from one place to another within the United States with
intent to evade the tax on spirituous liquors-was "more nearly
identical" to the offense of illegal transportation within the United
States than was "wrongful importation in evasion of the customs,"
the violation alleged in General Motors.50 Removal with intent to
evade was distinguishable from unlawful transportation "by the
quality of the intent" alone; importation was differentiated "by the
nature of the act" as well."5
United States v. The Ruth Mildred 52 extended the General
Motors rule to include violations of navigation as well as customs
laws. The Ruth Mildred upheld the forfeiture of a sea-going vessel
for carrying intoxicating liquor in violation of a condition of the
license under which the vessel operated.15 3 According to the Court,
146. Id. at 59.
147. Id. at 60.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 61.
151. Id.
152. 286 U.S. 67 (1932). A companion case, General Import & Export Co. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 70 (1932), applied the Ruth Mildred rationale in a libel action against a
ship that Coast Guard officers had seized for carrying an unmanifested cargo of intoxicating
liquor. Under the provisions of the statute involved in General Import & Export, the vessel
and its cargo were subject to forfeiture. See infra note 153.
153. The statutory basis for the forfeiture was Rev. Stat. § 4377 (2d ed. 1878), which
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the basis for the forfeiture of the vessel was "not a breach of the
[Volstead] Act nor any movement of transportation, lawful or un-
lawful"; instead, the government acted to forfeit the vehicle for a
distinct act, that of "engaging in a business other than the fishing
trade in violation of a license. '154
General Motors and its companions furnished the Supreme
Court with its final opportunity to mold forfeiture doctrine in the
prohibition context, for within a year after General Motors was de-
cided, the twenty-first amendment had repealed national prohibi-
tion.155 As a result, the number of Supreme Court decisions de-
clined sharply,156 although property forfeitures have remained a
significant part of American law through the present.1 57
provided in pertinent part as follows:
Whenever any licensed vessel is transferred, in whole or in part, to any person
who is not at the time of such transfer a citizen of and resident within the
United States, or is employed in any other trade than that for which she is li-
censed, or is found with a forged or altered license, or one granted for any other
vessel, such vessel with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the cargo, found
on board her, shall be forfeited.
154. The Ruth Mildred, 286 U.S. at 69.
155. The twenty-first amendment was ratified on December 5, 1933. See generally U.S.
DEPT. OF STATE, RATIFICATION OF THE TwENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (1934).
156. The Supreme Court's first significant forfeiture decision after prohibition came in
1939, and ironically, it involved bootleg whiskey. See United States v. One 1936 Model Ford,
307 U.S. 219 (1939) (upholding a district court's mitigation of the forfeiture of an automo-
bile under Rev. Stat. § 3450). Other modern decisions have confirmed the government's
authority to forfeit property used in unlawful activities. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
However, the Court has held that fourth and fifth amendment protections apply in forfei-
ture proceedings. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) (fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable in forfeiture proceedings under
26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1976)); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965)
(evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment may not be used in forfeiture
proceedings).
157. For a list of the modern forfeiture statutes at the federal level, see Note, Forfeit-
ures-Due Process-Supreme Court Upholds Forfeiture of Innocent Owner's Property
Without Prior Notice and Hearing, 60 CORNELL L. Rv. 467, 467 n.3 (1975). Both federal
and state governments have made extensive use of the forfeiture device in drug statutes.
See, e.g., Controlled Substances Act of 1970 § 511, 21 U.S.C § 881 (1976); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:989(A)(4)(West 1977); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3387, 3388 (McKinney 1977 &
Supp. 1982-83). In 1970, Congress expanded the forfeiture approach as a new weapon in the
battle against organized crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976); Controlled Substances Act of
1970 § 408, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(1976); see generally Note, supra note 14, at 792-93.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONAL PATTERN
When the Supreme Court's forfeiture decisions are viewed as a
group, the trend they manifest follows the general pattern common
to the Court's prohibition era decisions as a whole. The movement
from Goldsmith to Port Gardner to Richbourg evidences a growing
willingness to articulate doctrines that limit the government's en-
forcement alternatives, and that willingness was characteristic of
the Court's opinions in other areas as well.158
The opinion in Goldsmith, the first forfeiture opinion of the
prohibition era, was rendered early in 1921; the Court's sensitivity
in that case to the practical difficulties of law enforcement is typi-
cal of early prohibition cases. 159 Although the seizure involved in
Goldsmith occurred before the enactment of the eighteenth
amendment and the Volstead Act, wartime prohibition16 ° had al-
ready banned the production of the whiskey that was being trans-
ported in Goldsmith. Thus, the effect of the decision was to permit
the government to use a general forfeiture provision of the revenue
laws to enforce a statutory prohibition applicable to-intoxicating
liquor,1 61 and that permission understandably encouraged federal
prosecutors to resort to the same forfeiture provisions to
158. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 477-80.
159. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)(establishing the automobile
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement); Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57 (1924)(establishing the "open fields" exception to the fourth amendments warrant
requirement); Brede v. Powers, 263 U.S. 4 (1923) (allowing federal prosecutors to use infor-
mations rather than indictments to charge misdemeanors under the Volstead Act); Cunard
S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) (construing the Volstead Act to cover intoxicating
liquor kept as a part of a ship's store); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922) (sustaining a
state law establishing a presumption that persons who occupied real property on which a
distilling apparatus was found knew of its existence).
160. Supporters of prohibition relied upon the need to conserve food to aid the war
efforts as the basis for imposing liquor regulations that became increasingly strict as the
years passed. A 1917 statute forbade the importation of distilled spirits; banned the use of
foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds to produce distilled spirits for beverage purposes; and
authorized the president to extend the ban to malt or vinous beverages. Act of Aug. 10,
1917, ch. 53, 40 Stat. 276, 282. The following year, Congress first authorized the president to
establish prohibition zones around "coal mines, munition factories, shipbuilding plants, and
such other plants for war material." Act of Sept. 12, 1918, ch. 170, 40 Stat. 958, then forbade
the sale of distilled spirits and malt or vinous liquors except for export beginning June 30,
1919. Act of Nov. 21, 1918, ch. 212, 40 Stat. 1045, 1046. Title I of the Volstead Act extended
and expanded wartime prohibition until the eighteenth amendment became effective.
161. Act of Aug. 10, 1917, ch. 53, 40 Stat. 276, 282 (making it unlawful (1) to use any
foods, fruits, food materials or feeds to produce distilled spirits for beverage purposes or (2)
to import distilled spirits for beverage purposes).
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strengthen enforcement of the new statutory prohibitions found in
the Volstead Act.162
Along with several other forfeiture questions, the issue of
whether the government could rely on the general forfeiture provi-
sions of the revenue laws in prohibition cases surfaced again in the
Supreme Court during the second half of the 1920s. The Court's
opinions during this period proved as equivocal as the public's atti-
tude. By 1926 the public attitude toward prohibition had become
more ambivalent; while political opposition to prohibition had be-
gun to develop, the prohibition forces still remained in firm control
of the political process.16 3 The Supreme Court's opinions from the
middle and late 1920s seem to manifest a similar ambiguity regard-
ing prohibition. The majority opinions reflect incipient doubts
about certain techniques of prohibition enforcement and dissents
became more common, but the Court nonetheless remained willing
to grant prohibition officials broad enforcement authority."
The forfeiture decisions aptly illustrate the ambiguity of the
Court's opinions in the last half of the 1920s. In the four decisions
rendered over a two-day period in 1926,165 the Court both ap-
proved forfeiture as a device for prohibition enforcement and be-
gan to develop the doctrine that would ultimately preclude wide-
spread resort to the most commonly invoked forfeiture provision of
the revenue laws. Then two years later, it initiated a cautious ex-
pansion of the limiting doctrine.
Numerically, the government did quite well in the 1926 deci-
sions, for three of the four opinions endorsed the government's po-
sition with respect to property forfeitures. Van Oster emphatically
reaffirmed the government's constitutional power to forfeit the in-
terest that innocent persons held in property used to transport in-
toxicating liquor.166 In addition, One Ford Coupe indicated that
federal officials could use the general forfeiture provision of the
revenue laws in some situations,1 67 and Dodge permitted a forfei-
162. National Prohibition (Volstead) Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 308, 316 (1919); section 3
of the Volstead Act provided that no one could "manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import,
export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this Act."
Section 29 established penalties for violating these prohibitions.
163. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 475.
164. See id. at 477-79.
165. See supra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
166. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468.
167. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. at 330.
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ture under the Volstead Act despite the government's failure to
follow the procedural requirements of section 26 with precision."",
Despite the government's numerical success, the most signifi-
cant of the 1926 decisions proved to be Port Gardner, the one deci-
sion favoring a property claimant.""9 Port Gardner is important be-
cause it established the doctrinal base upon which One Ford
Coupe was finally overruled in fact, if not in theory.1 7 0
In 1926, however, the doctrinal status was much more ambigu-
ous. Port Gardner's limitation on governmental discretion was a
very narrow one; it only required the government to use the forfei-
ture provisions of section 26 when it chose to prosecute the person
in charge of the vehicle for illegally transporting intoxicating liquor
in violation of the Volstead Act.171 Several lines of doctrinal devel-
opment other than the one eventually adopted by the Court re-
mained open. For example, the Supreme Court could have followed
the lead of some lower federal courts by allowing recourse to the
general forfeiture provision while construing it narrowly so that it
would not cover all transportation cases. Alternatively, the Court
could have relied on the Willis-Campbell Act 7 3 to require forfei-
ture under section 26 only when the government elected to prose-
cute the person in charge of the property under the Volstead Act.
The Court also could have adopted an election doctrine which
turned on whether the person in charge of the vehicle was arrested
for violating the revenue laws or for violating the Volstead Act.17 4
The Court was only slightly less equivocal when it next consid-
ered the forfeiture issue in Commercial Credit two years later. 7 5
Commercial Credit expanded Port Gardner's election doctrine, but
168. Dodge, 272 U.S. at 531.
169. Port Gardner Inv. Co., 272 U.S. at 566.
170. The only possible use of the One Ford Coupe doctrine after Richbourg would be to
seize an automobile that was being used to conceal, but not transport, intoxicating liquor.
The likelihood of bootleggers making such use of an automobile was, at best, extremely
small.
171. 272 U.S. at 566.
172. See supra note 74; see also Note supra note 72, at 635.
173. An Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, ch. 134, §§ 4 & 5, 42 Stat.
222, 223 (1921); see generally supra note 126.
174. This argument was one way that Justice Cardozo's opinion in General Motors dis-
tinguished the Richbourg holding. 286 U.S. at 60; but see Richbourg Motor Co. v. United
States, 281 U.S. 528, at 534 (1930) (§ 26 procedures mandatory "whenever transportation is
involved").
175. 276 U.S. at 226.
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it did so in the narrowest possible fashion. Conviction for violating
the Volstead Act remained the event triggering the requirement
that the forfeiture proceed under section 26. Commercial Credit
simply applied the requirement to a conviction for illegal posses-
sion of intoxicating liquor when the possession was in fact associ-
ated with illegal transportation of the liquor." 6 Like the 1926 deci-
sions, the Commercial Credit approach is consistent with the
larger pattern. The Court was increasingly willing to limit the gov-
ernment's enforcement tactics, but it was unwilling to articulate
doctrines that significantly restricted the government's power.
By the time the election issue returned to the Court in the
1930s, the Court had become far more willing to limit the enforce-
ment options available to prohibition officials. Richbourg77 reflects
that new boldness, and the continuity in result between Richbourg
and Commercial Credit should not obscure the contrast in ap-
proach and in rhetoric. Unlike Commercial Credit, Richbourg did
not simply extend the Port Gardner election rule one more step to
cover indictments or even arrests; instead, it reshaped the rule to
make section 26 the exclusive means for forfeiture whenever a ve-
hicle was being used to transport intoxicating liquor.17 8
Disregarding arguably contrary language in the text of the
Willis-Campbell Act,179 as well as in the legislative history of the
Volstead Act itself,180 the Court was able to protect innocent own-
ers and lienors with interests in property used to transport intoxi-
cating liquor by inventing a new purpose for section 26. According
to the Court, section 26 did not involve-as the historical record
suggests 81 -an innovative expansion of the forfeiture concept be-
yond its traditional use in revenue and customs laws. To the con-
trary, the Court viewed the enactment of section 26 as a noble ef-
fort to limit the possibility that "innocent" property interests
might be forfeited under earlier statutes. 82 Having postulated this
purpose for the section, the Court proceeded naturally to its ulti-
mate conclusion that the government was required to use section
176. Id. at 232.
177. 281 U.S. at 532.
178. Id. at 533.
179. Ch. 134, §§ 4 & 5, 42 Stat. 222, 223 (1921); see generally supra note 126.
180. See supra note 125.
181. See supra notes 28-38, 121 and accompanying text.
182. Richbourg, 281 U.S. at 534.
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26 in those transportation cases to which it applied.
The changing rhetoric of the forfeiture opinions parallels the
shifting decisional pattern outlined above. The opinion in Gold-
smith accepted forfeiture as a reasonable restriction on property
rights that balanced the legitimate needs of government against
the interests of property owners.""' Even though the cases from the
middle of the decade began to fashion a statutory limit on the fed-
eral government's right to forfeit vehicles used to transport intoxi-
cating liquor, the Court's rhetoric as well as its decisions demon-
strate that this period was a transitional one. The opinions reflect
no special concern for innocent property owners; instead, they es-
sentially base the new limitations on analyses of the words in the
Volstead Act.8 4 In contrast, the language of Richbourg, the leading
decision of the 1930s, emphasizes the impact on innocent parties as
a prime justification for redefining and expanding the limitations
that had been developed in earlier cases.
Although the foregoing discussion documents the general cor-
relation between changing public attitudes and the decisional and
rhetorical drift of the forfeiture decisions, the correlation is not
perfect. At least three discontinuities deserve further analysis-the
Court's willingness to permit recourse to general forfeiture statutes
in the post-Richbourg decisions, the Court's failure to limit the
Goldsmith holding affirming the government's constitutional power
to forfeit the property rights of innocent persons, and the Court's
adoption of an antiprohibition position in the 1921 Yuginovich de-
cision.18 5 To account for these exceptions to the general pattern
requires a refined explanation of the impact prohibition had, as
well as an acknowledgement of the independent role exerted by the
"taught tradition of the law."'88 At first glance, the discontinuity in
the post-Richbourg cases seems quite substantial, for these cases
refused to extend Richbourg to require that all prohibition forfeit-
ures be effected under section 26. Thus, Ryan allowed recourse to a
general provision of the revenue laws to forfeit saloon furnish-
ings,'87 while General Motors and its companions declined to apply
183. 254 U.S. at 505; see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 84-109 and accompanying text.
185. 256 U.S. at 450.
186. Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HARv. L. REv. 365,
366 (1940).
187. 284 U.S. at 176; see supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
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Richbourg to violations of the customs and navigation laws. s8 In-
asmuch as all of these decisions favor the government, they seem
at first glance to contradict the hypothesis that attitudes toward
prohibition influenced the direction of doctrinal development. But
when examined more closely, this last set of decisions is better un-
derstood as offering more of a modification than a challenge to the
general prohibition theme. In essence, the Court seemed to be
more willing to limit forfeiture authority when the limitation could
be confined to prohibition cases and when it protected ordinary
citizens rather than organized law breakers.
One can easily justify Ryan's refusal to apply Richbourg to the
forfeiture of saloon furnishings on grounds of the language of sec-
tion 26,189 but the Ryan majority's broad interpretation of the stat-
utory provisions on which the government relied is less easily ex-
plained on formalistic grounds. From a grammatical perspective,
Ryan's argument that the forfeiture section should be narrowly
construed was not insubstantial.1 90 As a result, one is left with the
question of why the Supreme Court was willing to construe the
statute broadly in the final days of prohibition. Two answers seem
to merit acceptance. First, in Ryan the Court was construing a gen-
eral tax statute, not a prohibition law, and thus a narrow interpre-
tation could restrict collection procedures for other taxes as well as
restrain officials attempting to use the revenue laws to aid in pro-
hibition enforcement. The Richbourg approach produced no such
difficulties. By construing section 26 to supersede the revenue stat-
utes for cases involving the transportation of intoxicating liquor,
the Court effectively confined its protection to the prohibition con-
text and kept the general provision available to help enforce other
revenue laws. Second, the nature of the activities prompting the
seizures in Richbourg and Ryan differed significantly. Richbourg
involved automotive transportation, the new American pastime of
188. 286 U.S. at 60; see supra notes 139-51 and accompanying text.
189. The language of § 26 directed officials to seize the "vehicle" a person used in trans-
porting intoxicating liquor. In Ryan, the property seized was not a vehicle, nor was any
liquor being transported when the seizure was made unless carrying the liquor to the sa-
loon's customers amounted to unlawful transportation.
190. The second and third clauses of Rev. Stat. § 3453 constituted a single sentence
while the first clause was a separate sentence. See supra note 110. The Court rejected this
argument on the ground that the separation of the three clauses into two sentences was a




the 1920s. Ryan involved the operation of a saloon, the very evil
that had fueled the prohibition movement in the first place. After
all, equating anti-saloon sentiment with prohibition had been the
great political accomplishment of the Anti-Saloon League,191 and
even those trying to repeal prohibition in the 1930s avoided the
identification with the saloon. They continually repeated their
wholehearted opposition to the return of the saloon.19 2 The Court
seems to have reflected a similar attitude in Richbourg and Ryan.
It became increasingly willing to protect ordinary citizens against
excesses of prohibition enforcement; it was less inclined to support
and protect organized criminal involvement in the activity that
had been instrumental in consolidating prohibition strength.
The formal argument for following Richbourg was considera-
bly stronger in the customs and navigation cases that were decided
after Ryan. In each, intoxicating liquors were being transported in
automobiles or boats at the time of the seizures and Richbourg had
held that section 26 procedures were mandatory "whenever trans-
portation is involved."193 Nonetheless, in General Motors the
Court refused to require the government to proceed under section
26 in importation cases,' and it expanded that holding to include
the navigation laws in The Ruth Mildred.195
Two factors seem to explain the Court's relatively restrained
approach in General Motors and The Ruth Mildred as compared
to its approach in Richbourg. For one thing, the general forfeiture
statutes in the customs and navigation cases did not threaten to
swallow up the whole of section 26, as did the one involved in
Richbourg. Although transportation might have been an indispen-
sable element of the smuggling involved in General Motors and
The Ruth Mildred, many, and probably most, transportation cases
involved liquor produced within the United States; in contrast, vir-
tually every transportation case would involve the removal of li-
quor with intent to defraud the government of the tax because the
government would not permit the tax to be paid.196 In addition,
191. P. ODEGARD, supra note 2, at 38-48. See also H. ASBURY, supra note 2, at 112; N.
CLARK, DELIVER Us FRoM EVIL, supra note 2, at 94-95; S. CASHMAN, supra note 2, at 7.
192. See, e.g., D. KYVIG supra note 2, at 58; C. MERZ, supra note 2, at 289-99.
193. 281 U.S. at 534.
194. 286 U.S. at 60.
195. 286 U.S. at 69; see supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.




the activity prompting the seizure in General Motors and its com-
panions was similar to the one involved in Ryan in that it was an
activity condemned even by opponents of prohibition; smuggling,
like operating a saloon but unlike carrying liquor in an automobile,
was not an activity in which ordinary citizens engaged.19 7
The second discontinuity-failing to limit Goldsmith's consti-
tutional holding-requires more of a qualification to the thesis that
changing attitudes toward prohibition guided the development of
the forfeiture decisions. Insofar as changing attitudes provided the
decisive influence, one would expect the later decisions would have
modified or overruled Goldsmith, but no such development took
place. To the contrary, Van Oster explicitly reaffirmed the Gold-
smith rule in 1926,198 and even the decisions of the 1930s implicitly
confirmed Congress' constitutional power to forfeit the property
interests of innocent persons."9
In fact, the Goldsmith discontinuity seems to reflect an influ-
ence of one aspect of legal training and tradition-the reluctance
to overrule existing precedents. This reluctance to overrule was
typical of the Supreme Court during the prohibition era,200 and it
manifests itself in other doctrinal developments that were signifi-
cantly influenced by the prohibition experience. 201 Acknowledge-
ment of this influence of legal training and tradition should not
obscure, however, the relatively limited role it played. Although
the reluctance to overrule guided the course of the later judicial
decisions by focusing attention on statutory rather than constitu-
tional issues, it did not deflect the basic direction or pattern of the
decisions. Foreclosure of the constitutional question did not force
the Court to uphold the forfeitures in the later cases. As in other
197. For another example of the Court using a statutory construction approach to limit
its protection to "innocent" violators, see Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932);
Murchison, supra note 9, at 235-36. For another example of a less favorable decision on a
statutory issue involving the relatively serious offense of manufacturing bootleg whiskey, see
Danovitz v. United States, 281 U.S. 389 (1930)(liberal construction of Section 25 of Title II
of the Volstead Act to allow forfeiture of property used in the illegal manufacture of intoxi-
cating liquor).
198. 272 U.S. at 468; see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
199. General Motors Accep. Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 56-58 (1932); Rich-
bourg, 281 U.S. at 530.
200. See A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 15-16, 50 (1958 ed.); 1
W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 224-25 (1969); 2 id. at
37-38 (1970).
201. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 501-02.
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doctrinal areas, 0 2 the Court found ways to circumvent the early
decisions without overruling them.
The third discontinuity-the anti-prohibition character of the
1921 decision in Yuginovich-offers the most substantial challenge
to the general thesis developed in these pages. Since the opinion
was issued in the very first year of prohibition when support for
the eighteenth amendment and the Volstead Act was strong, one
would have anticipated Yuginovich to support prohibition enforce-
ment authorities, but it did not. Instead, it rebuffed the attempt of
prohibition officials to augment the modest penalties of the Vol-
stead Act by relying on the stricter punishments set forth in the
revenue laws. Of -course, one could dismiss Yuginovich from the
present discussion on the ground that it involved criminal penal-
ties rather than forfeitures. That dismissal is less than satisfactory,
however. The criminal penalties involved in Yuginovich were lo-
cated in the same sections of the revenue laws that contained the
general forfeiture provisions. Thus, the practical impact of Yugi-
novich was to preclude resort to the forfeiture provisions as an aid
to prohibition enforcement.
The most persuasive explanation of Yuginovich interprets it
as offering a second illustration of the way legal training and tradi-
tion influenced the decisional pattern. Despite the swift legislative
response to the Supreme Court's decision,0 3 the decision prompted
no discernible scholarly critique in the legal literature.204 The rea-
son for this scholarly indifference apparently lies in the fact that
Yuginovich involved an application of the accepted canon of con-
struction declaring that a comprehensive criminal statute should
be interpreted to repeal prior statutes covering the same subject
matter and providing lesser penalties,20 5 and the Court's applica-
tion appeared unexceptional to lawyers.
Yuginovich thus provides either the major anomaly to the
theme of the prohibition cases, or it illustrates the ability of the
"taught tradition of the law" to lead to specific decisions out of
202. In the fourth amendment area, the Court's primary means of circumventing prior
decisions involved drawing tenuous factual distinctions. See id. at 491-99.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
204. Yuginovich is not listed in the "Table of Cases Commented On" section of the
Index to Legal Periodicals during the 1920-23 period.
205. G. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, 317-19, 320-22
(1888); 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 483-84 (2d ed. 1904).
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harmony with public attitudes. One must note, however, the rela-
tively limited impact that legal ideology exerted when the result it
produced conflicted sharply with public attitudes. Congress quick-
ly overruled the specific holding in Yuginovich in the Willis-Camp-
bell Act,20 6 and the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the new
law the following year.20 Thus, the net effect of the taught tradi-
tion was to produce a specific decision out of harmony with the
general pattern, not to reverse the general pattern nor to affect the
general direction of the prohibition enforcement effort.
CONCLUSION
The legislative decision to authorize property forfeitures as a
method for enforcing national prohibition produced a variety of
novel and difficult problems with which the Supreme Court strug-
gled throughout the prohibition era. In resolving these problems,
the Court issued thirteen separate opinions, more than two-thirds
of all the forfeiture decisions it has rendered in the twentieth cen-
tury. These decisions provide insight as to the source of contempo-
rary forfeiture concepts, the scope of prohibition's impact upon
American law, and the nature of the judiciary's role in implement-
ing statutory reform.
From the standpoint of contemporary law, the most important
forfeiture decisions of the prohibition era are undoubtedly the con-
stitutional cases, Goldsmith and Van Oster, for the rule they de-
clare remains current constitutional dogma. As recently as 1974,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of forfeiting
the property interests of innocent owners,208 and the opinion in
that case relied upon Goldsmith and Van Oster as important mod-
ern precedents for the constitutional holding. In contrast, the later
decisions of the prohibition era turned on statutory issues that
largely disappeared with the repeal of the eighteenth amendment
and the Volstead Act. As a result, these decisions have no direct
progeny in contemporary law, although one can perhaps detect a
continuation of the desire to protect property interests in the first
forfeiture decision the Court rendered after prohibition was
206. § 5, 42 Stat. 223.
207. United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477 (1923).
208. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); see also C. J.




The irony of the impact these prohibition decisions have had
is obvious. Even though the general trend of the prohibition cases
increased protections afforded innocent owners, the constitutional
issues were settled early in the prohibition era when the Court was
less solicitous of persons with interests in forfeited property. Since
the Court never overruled these early decisions,210 they remain au-
thoritative precedents that the Court has continued to follow long
after the repeal of prohibition.
Regardless of the influence the prohibition cases have had on
contemporary issues, they are certainly instructive from a histori-
cal perspective, for they provide a more complete picture of prohi-
bition's impact upon American law during the years when the
eighteenth amendment was part of the Constitution. The basic dis-
covery that proceeds from analysis of the forfeiture decisions is the
recognition that the decisional pattern they display is the same one
manifested in other doctrinal areas. Goldsmith, the first prohibi-
tion era decision, gave strong encouragement to prohibition au-
thorities. However, by the time the Court rendered the next group
of opinions, it began to interpret section 26 to impose increasingly
stringent restrictions on law enforcement authorities (although it
did continue to reaffirm the permissibility of forfeiting the inter-
ests of innocent owners). Finally, in the last years of prohibition,
the Court managed to turn section 26 on its head by ascribing to it
the purpose of restricting rather than expanding the reach of the
prior forfeiture statutes.
As was true in other doctrinal areas, the trend of the forfeiture
decisions was neither arbitrary nor compulsory.21' Considered to-
gether, the decisions moved in harmony with changing public atti-
tudes toward prohibition, and this movement cannot fairly be dis-
209. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219 (1939). The Supreme Court
also rendered two relatively liberal decisions in more modem times, United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693 (1965), but those decisions are probably better understood as part of the
Court's tendency to expand individual rights during the 1960s and early 1970s than as the
result of a lingering impact of prohibition.
210. Reluctance directly to overrule precedents was a characteristic of both the Taft
and Hughes courts. See A. MASON, THE SUPREmE COURT FROM TAFT TO WARRENs 15-16, 30
(1958 ed.); 1 W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTrruTiON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 224-25
(1969); Murchison, supra note 8, at 501, 527.
211. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 520-32; Murchison, supra note 9, at 234-36.
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missed on the grounds that the Court's decisions were dictated by
some internal logic of the law. As the preceding analysis has
demonstrated, the Court had several lines of development availa-
ble to it, and neither the statutory language nor the legislative his-
tory dictated the approach the Court ultimately chose.
This indication that prohibition's influence can be discerned
in forfeiture cases offers further evidence of the pervasive nature of
prohibition's impact on American legal thought. To some degree,
the confirmation adheres in the realization that the forfeiture cases
illustrate still another area in which the developments in legal
thought paralleled changing public attitudes towards prohibition.
But the forfeiture cases offer more than just another example of
this phenomenon, for they exhibit the pattern in a new context
from at least two perspectives. Most obviously, they indicate that
the direction of statutory construction followed the doctrinal de-
velopments in nonstatutory areas. In addition, the forfeiture cases
are explicitly concerned with property rights, and they demon-
strate the mutability of legal doctrine extended to property con-
cepts as well as purely personal rights. The addition of these two
perspectives thus serves both to emphasize the pervasive character
of prohibition's impact and to counsel anyone seeking to under-
stand the Supreme Court's decisions in the 1920s and early 1930s
to take seriously the prohibition backdrop against which these de-
cisions were rendered.
Not only do the forfeiture decisions confirm the importance of
prohibition for understanding American legal developments, they
also clarify the nature of that impact in at least two respects. First,
they indicate that even though property interests were not immu-
table, those interests occupy a preferred position on the scale of
judicial values. When compared with other prohibition era deci-
sions, the first forfeiture cases to invalidate the enforcement tactics
of prohibition authorities appeared relatively early, during the
middle years of the prohibition era (Port Gardner in 1926 and
Commercial Credit in 1928), rather than during the last years of
prohibition when the Court started expanding other doctrines.212
212. See, e.g., Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41(1933); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932); Grau v. United States, 287
U.S. 124 (1932); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). The Court occasionally decided cases in the mid-1920s
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Although far from conclusive, this early appearance of judicial pro-
tection in the forfeiture cases suggests that the prohibition era
Court was more willing to protect interests that could be grounded
in property rights, a suggestion that finds support in the Court's
decisions in areas not directly related to prohibition.213 Second, the
forfeiture decisions also demonstrate a tendency to structure statu-
tory interpretation in a manner that confined the protections cre-
ated solely to prohibition cases and that avoided endorsing organ-
ized lawlessness. The Court's decisions after 1930 offer the most
vivid illustration of this tendency. In a typical transportation case
like Richbourg, the Court was willing to announce a bold new in-
terpretation of section 26. The Court was much more cautious in
Ryan, where it was construing a general revenue statute in a case
involving a saloon, and in General Motors and The Ruth Mildred,
where it was asked to interpret section 26 to limit the govern-
ment's ability to forfeit automobiles and boats, used by smugglers.
In short, the Court was more likely to expand protections for the
individual in situations that might involve otherwise law-abiding
citizens and in situations that could be expected to disappear when
prohibition was finally repealed.. 4
At the same time the forfeiture cases confirm the importance
of the prohibition backdrop, they also caution against a reduction-
ist, unicausal theory of the judicial decisions. In particular, the for-
feiture decisions illustrate that legal training and tradition also in-
fluenced the decisional process in at least two ways. For one thing,
the Court's reluctance to overrule existing precedents operated to
channel the decisional course, although it did not deflect its basic
direction. Specifically, the reluctance to overturn served to pre-
serve the rule affirming the constitutionality of forfeitures of the
interests held by innocent persons and to guide legal efforts to
avoid the constitutional rule toward statutory issues. In addition,
at least one forfeiture-related decision, Yuginovich, seems to have
followed legal training and tradition to a specific decision inconsis-
adversely to the government; these cases usually involved relatively minor violations. See,
e.g., Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927).
213. See, e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); Jay Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) overruled in
West Coast v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1936); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
214. For a similar tendency in the Court's construction of the entrapment defense, see
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Murchison, supra note 9, at 224-36.
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tent with the general drift of the decisions as a whole. Yuginovich
thus serves to limit the causative claim that can legitimately be
pressed for general social forces like prohibition. While these social
forces do appear to direct the general pattern of judicial decisions,
they do not dictate the precise results of individual cases.
In addition to confirming and clarifying prohibition's impact
upon legal thought, studying the forfeiture cases also offers insight
into the broader question of the judicial role in implementing stat-
utory reforms. By way of a specific example, the cases illustrate
that even detailed statutes take on new meanings with the passage
of time and that the trend of statutory interpretation tends to be
shaped by the same external stimuli that guide the trend or drift
of decisions in nonstatutory areas. As social values change, judges
interpret both statutes and prior decisions to harmonize them with
the new values. Thus, understanding the direction of any given
area of legal thought requires more than technical competence. It
requires a sensitivity to the political and social forces that shape
the intellectual and cultural life of the community as a whole.
One must, of course, acknowledge distinctions between judicial
decisions in statutory and nonstatutory areas, and the prohibition
cases illustrate at least two of these differences. First, the legisla-
ture's choice of statutory language sets the parameters for the legal
development. Specifically, in the prohibition cases the debate was
directed initially at the implied repeal language of section 35 of the
Volstead Act,215 and later at the use of mandatory language in sec-
tion 26.216 Thus, even though the statutory language did not deter-
mine the direction in which the Court's opinions would move, it
did establish the framework within which that movement would
proceed. In addition, the prohibition cases also illustrate the con-
tinuing legislative involvement in the process of statutory interpre-
tation. In essence, the legislature assumes a veto power over the
judiciary's handling of the statutory creature the legislature has
brought into being. When the judiciary's action sharply conflicts
with the legislative consensus, as did the Court's decision in Yugi-
novich, the legislature can always overrule the judicial decision,
and it can do so quickly. On the other hand, the Court has signifi-
cant leeway to transform the statute when it acts consistently with
215. National Prohibition (Volstead) Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 317-18 (1919).
216. Id. at 315-16.
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the existing legislative consensus, as illustrated by the absence of a
statutory response to the Court's almost total transformation of
section 26 in the middle and later years of prohibition.
Ultimately, the forfeiture cases of the prohibition era demon-
strate that statutory reform, like judicial reform, is more a process
than an event. The enactment is merely a step in the process, not
its final consummation. What the statute really "means" will be-
come clear only gradually, and that meaning is more likely to re-
flect the political and intellectual consensus existing at the time a
judicial decision is rendered than the consensus existing when the
statute was originally enacted.

